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Statutory Misinterpretations: A Legal Autopsy
Eric Schnappee*
If the Supreme Court is willing to learn from past mistakes,'
the Court would find it particularly instructive to re-examine the
now quite numerous civil rights decisions which have failed to
survive congressional scrutiny. The United States Reports are today
littered with the corpses of short-lived opinions purporting to
interpret federal anti-discrimination statutes; most were dead on
arrival in the bound volumes. October Term 1988 was a veritable
Pickett's Charge of conservative misinterpretation. Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union' briefly displaced and destroyed much of section 1981; Public Employees Retirement System v. Betts' temporarily
overran parts of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act;
Dellmuth v. Muth4 for a time made 'substantial inroads into the
Education of the Handicapped Act, while four other opinions attacked the viability of Title VII. 5 All for naught. By the end of the
next Congress, every one of these decisions had been felled by
legislative action. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, wiping out in one
blow eight different Supreme Court decisions, was an historically
unique repudiation of judicial interpretation of the nation's statutes; not since the post-Civil War amendments obliterated Barron

* Assistant Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.; Lecturer in
Law, Columbia University;, BA. 1962, MA. 1963, Johns Hopkins University; B.Phil. 1965,
Oxford University;, LL.B. 1968, Yale University. The author participated in the drafting
and negotiation of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
1 In several of the cases discussed below, the dissenting opinions warned in vain
that'the majority's methodology had previously led to results that were overturned by
Congress. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 1154-55 (1991)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 191 n.9
(1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 240-41 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
2 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
3 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
4 491 U.S. 223 (1989).
5 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989); Martin Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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v. City Council of Baltimore and Dred Scott v. Sandford had Congress attacked the work of the Court with such ferocity.
The legal carnage wrought by the 1991 Civil Rights Act was
unprecedented, but not unforeseeable. Prior to the late 1970's, it
was uncommon for Congress to denounce and overturn a Supreme Court decision on the ground that the Court had misinterpreted the law. But from 1978 to 1990 Congress had repeatedly
been compelled to take that once extraordinary action, adopting a
total of eight different statutes overturning Supreme Court decisions which Congress believed had misread the statutes involved.
Even before the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Congress had made unmistakably clear that there were fatal flaws in the way in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist and his conservative colleagues were interpreting
these laws.
Barely three months after the 1977 decision in United Air
Lines, Inc. v. McMann,8 Congress overturned the holding in that
case as "erroneou[s]" and inconsistent with the "clear explanation
of legislative intent."9 In 1978, the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act'0 nullified the Supreme Court's decision in General Electric Co.
v. Gilbert," the House report insisted that "the dissenting Justices
correctly interpreted the Act", and warned that "the Supreme
Court's narrow interpretations of Title VII tend to erode our national policy of nondiscrimination in employment.""2 The Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 19821s rejected the holding in City of
Mobile v. Bolden 4 that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not
forbid election practices with a discriminatory effect; the Senate
Committee insisted that restoration of the discriminatory effect
rule was "consistent with the original legislative understanding of
Section 2," explaining that legislative history supporting an effect
rule was "the most direct evidence of how Congress understood

6

32 U.S. 243 (1833).

7

60 U.S. 393 (1857).

8 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
9 S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977).
10 Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988)).

11
12

429 U.S. 125 (1976).
H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1978).

13

Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, § 2, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (1982) (codified at

42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1988)).
14 446 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1980).
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the provision."15 Thd Court's decision in Smith v. Robinson,6 regarding remedies for children unlawfully denied special education
classes, was set aside by the Handicapped Children's Protection
Act of 198617 as contrary to "Congress' original intent." 8 In
Grove City College v. Bel 1 9 a majority of the Supreme Court ruled
that federal laws prohibiting discrimination by recipients of federal
funds applied only to the particular program or activity receiving
that financial assistance; Congress enacted legislation nullifying
that decision, recounting in detail the legislative histories of the
laws at issue, and concluding that "[c]ontrary to the view of the
Supreme Court... Congress intended institution wide coverage. " 20 Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon'w
held that monetary
relief could not be obtained against a state for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; Congress promptly restored
that remedy, the Senate conference report explaining, "The Supreme Court's decision misinterpreted congressional intent, Such a
gap in Section 504 coverage was never intended."2 2 When
Dellmuth v. MuthV held that a state could not be sued for violating the Education of the Handicapped Act, Congress used virtually
identical language24 to explain the enactment of legislation authorizing such suits. The legislation overturning Public Employees
Retirement System v. Bett was accompanied by an exhaustive discussion of the legislative history of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and concluded that Betts had interpreted that Act
"incorrectly."2 6
Despite these repeated demonstrations of congressional dissatisfaction with the way. it was interpreting federal statutes, a majority of the Supreme Court apparently did not get it, or did not

15 S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1982).
16 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
17 Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, § 2, 100 Stat. 796 (1986) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4) (1988)).
18 9. REP. No. 112, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1985).
19 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
20 S. REP. No. 64, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1988).
21 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
22 S. REP. NO. 388, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1986).
23 491 U.S. 223 (1989).
24 H.R. REP. No. 544, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1990) ("'he Committee has determined that the Supreme Court misinterpreted congressional intent. Such a gap in coverage was never intended.")
25 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
26 S. REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1990).
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care.17 By the time of the 1991 debates on the Civil Rights Act,
congressional disapproval was increasingly directed at the Court
itself. Particularly outspoken, Senator Chaffee, a member of the
Senate Republican leadership," stated, "In 1989 the Supreme
Court handed down a series of decisions interpreting employment
discrimination statutes in what might at best be described as a
stingy, cramped manner. At worst the Court threw logic and precedent out the window."' On another occasion, Senator Chaffee
asserted, "At worst, the Court took a 180-degree turn from what
we in Congress over the years have tried to do. At best they took
an unnecessarily severe interpretation of our intent."" Other
speakers joined in criticizing the method of interpretation that
had resulted in the decisions which the Civil Rights Act overturned. For example, Rep. Ford stated, "[The Act] makes right
what the Supreme Court made wrong and sends a powerful message that the American people reject the Supreme Court's narrow
and crabbed interpretation of civil rights laws generally and equal
employment opportunity statutes specifically." 1 Similarly, Rep.
Norton remarked, "[T]his began as an exercise to save the basic
job discrimination statute from the Supreme Court ....
A conservative court, presumably deferential to the legislative branch,
departed from its own principles, usurped legislative intent, and
rewrote [T]itle VII."s Rep. Goodling also criticized the Court,
stating, "[T]he Supreme Court restricted Federal civil rights
protections in a manner that was not consistent with the intent of
Congress.""3 The Court's decisions were denounced as "wrongly

27 Six months after Congress overwhelmingly approved legislation overturning the
decision in Paterson, excoriating the majority opinion as a model of misinterpretation,
Justice Thomas, in an opinion joined by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist, cited
Patterson as a paradigm of interpretive methodology. Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct.
1881, 1902 n.7 (1992) (dissenting opinion). Justice Thomas also bemoaned the failure of
the majority to follow "the principles" of McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987),

which itself had been overturned by Congress in 1988. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,
sec. 7603, 102 Star. 4181, 4508 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988)).
28 Senator Chaffee subsequently lost his leadership position because of his support
of the Civil Rights Act.
29 137 CONG. REc. S15470 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991).
30 137 CONG. Rac. S7027 (daily ed. June 4, 1991).
31

137 CONG. REc. H9533 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991).

32 137 CONG. REC. H3952 (daily ed. June 5, 1991).
33 137 CONG. REc. H3900 (daily ed., June 4, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Goodling); see
also id. at S7026 (daily ed. June 4, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Durenburger) ("All interested
parties, including the administration, civil rights groups and business groups, agree that
[Patterson and Lorance] incorrectly narrowed the protections available to minorities"); id. at
H3848 (remarks of Rep. Martinez) ("[the act] clears up a Supreme Court misreading");
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decided, " ' "not consistent with the intent of Congress," 5 and a
"misinterpretation of U.S. civil rights law. " '
For all participants in the ongoing judicial and academic
debate regarding the most appropriate method of statutory construction, the action of Congress in enacting nine different statutes overturning as incorrect sixteen Supreme Court decisions
interpreting civil rights statutes provides an invaluable reality
check. The Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that
'where... error is a matter of serious concern.
correction
can be had by legislation." 7 From 1978 to 1991 serious errors in
sixteen separate Supreme Court decisions' were corrected by
legislation. 9 That pattern of legislative correction also demonstrated the existence of, and was a response to, a more fundamental error in the very method by which the Court had originally
interpreted the statutes at issue.
The greatest importance of these nine corrective statutes is
that they teach, by example, the proper methodology for interpreting statutes. The principles of statutory construction are too complex and subtle to embody in some, statute, a sort of Uniform
Statutory. Construction Code, that could be mechanically applied.
The fashioning and fine tuning of the proper methodology is very
much a matter of experience, and no experience could be more
relevant than a repeated and emphatic determination by the Congress that what the courts have been doing is seriously flawed. The
evolution of substantive law involves a complex interaction between the legislative and judicial branches, each responding to the

id. at H3875 (remarks of Rep. Gradison) ("In my view, the Court erred in its interpretation of the intent of Congress. I believe the Congress should move to correct the Court's
decisions.").

34 137 CONG. REC. S15500 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Danforth).
35 137 CONG. REc. H3900 (daily ed. June 4, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Goodling).
36 137 CONG. REc. S7026 (daily ed. June 4, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Durenberger).
37 Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424 (1986)
(quoting Burnet v. Colorado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 n.14 (1974) (also quoting BurneO.
38 In a number of instances a particular statute overturned several decisions which
contained the same mistaken interpretation. For example, the holding in Grove City
College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), overturned by the Civil Rights Restoration Act, had
been reiterated in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
39 In several instances the dissents had correctly anticipated that congressional action. West Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, III S. Ct. 1138, 1154-55 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 672 (1989) (Stevens,
J., dissenting); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 218-19 (1977) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
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actions and experiences of the other as new issues are faced and
addressed. The methodology of statutory interpretation, as much
as substantive law, should be shaped by that interaction between
the two branches of government. Individual Justices may have
philosophical views regarding statutory interpretation, but in the
final analysis the Congress is, or at least ought to be, the master
of statutory law.
This Article seeks to ascertain what lessons can and should be
drawn from the action of Congress in adopting these nine corrective statutes. It suggests as its premise that the sixteen decisions
overturned by Congress, although now just historic curiosities in
the substantive law, are of unique importance for interpretive
methodology because they embody the approach to statutory construction which Congress has so emphatically rejected.
The analysis which follows is thus in the nature of an autopsy
of these disinterred decisions, seeking to determine what fatal
defect was their undoing. It seeks, as well, to determine what rules
of construction, if applied in these sixteen cases, would have yielded the interpretations which Congress has now indicated would
have been the correct ones.
An analysis of this sort is surely essential to the proper interpretation of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and the other eight corrective statutes. No one but an incorrigible judicial recidivist would
consider instead applying to these statutes the very defective interpretive methodology that the Congress condemned in enacting
those corrective laws. The lessons to be learned from these nine
statutes, and from the sixteen short-lived decisions they overturned, are not limited to the particular provisions misinterpreted
and then amended, or to civil rights. Nothing in the action of
Congress suggested it would have agreed with the sixteen decisions
had they only dealt with some other subject. In the sixteen overturned opinions both the majorities and the dissenters purported
to invoke interpretive principles of general application. The disputes in these cases regarding interpretive methodology routinely
appear in non-civil rights cases, although the positions of particular Justices on these recurring issues certainly vary from case to
case. Whatever was wrong with that methodology in these decisions would equally be error in interpreting a securities, trademark, tax, maritime, or social security statute.
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I.

"PLAIN LANGUAGE" AND FANCY CONSTRUCTION

In at least seven of the overturned decisions,4 0 a majority of
the Supreme Court insisted that its interpretation of the statute at
issue was required by the obvious meaning of that law. In
Patterson,for example, the majority maintained that its narrow construction of section 1981 was dictated by the "plain terms4 and
"fair and natural reading"42 of the law, compelled "as a matter of
logic or semantics,"4 and constituted the "plain and common
sense meaning." The majority further asserted that any broader
reading of the law' would be "tortuous" and "strain[ed] in an undue manner.'
In United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann,' the Court
asserted that it had interpreted the ADEA in the manner required
by the "plain" and "unambiguous" language of the statute.4 7 The
majority opinion in Betts repeatedly explained that its construction
of the same law was mandated by the "plain statutory language."" West Virginia University Hospitals v. Casey49 held that the
2
"plain,"' "unambiguous,"51 and "normal import of the text"
involved "demonstrates convincingly" 3 the correctness of the
Court's interpretation. In General Electric Company v. Gilbert,' the
majority asserted its interpretation was compelled by "the 'plain
meaning' of the langiage used ,by Congress. " The Court insisted that a less restrictive view of the law would have required "ig-

40 In addition to the cases cited in the text, see EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111
S. Ct. 1127, 1129 (1991) (application of Title VII abroad "lacks support in the plain language of the statute"); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60 (1980) ("it is apparent
that the language of §2" prohibits only practices with a discriminatory purpose).
41 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176 (1989).
42 Id. at 185.
43 Id. at 177.
44 Id. at 185 n.6.
45 Id. at 181, 185.
46 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
47 Id. at 199, 201; see also id. at 203 (the Court uses "ordinary parlance" and "ordinary meaning").
48 ' Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 172 (1989).
49 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991).
50 Id. at 1146.
51 Id. at 1147.
52 Id. at 1146.
53 Id. at 1141.
54 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
55 Id. at 145.
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noring [the] language" at issue in Grove City College
v. Beel
57
"rewriting" the provision applied in Martin v. Wtlks

and

Under the methodology invoked in these cases the principal
significance of "plain meaning", as opposed to merely "likely,"
"apparent," or "probable meaning," was that a judicial finding of
"plain meaning" triggered an exclusionary rule of considerable
importance. Once a court found "plain" meaning, it was authorized, indeed required, to ignore all other circumstances that
might otherwise bear on the interpretation of the law at issue.
Thus in Betts, when the plaintiff employee sought to invoke the
legislative history of the ADEA, the majority dismissed that history
as simply irrelevant, stating, "In view of our interpretation of the
plain statutory language ...

this reliance on legislative history is

misplaced."' In most of the "plain language" cases, the majority
simply ignored arguments regarding the legislative history of the
statute involved.5 9 Similarly, Betts held, the regulations promulgated by the agency charged with implementation of a statute are
entitled to "no deference" if they are "at odds with the plain language of the statute itself.' ° This use of the plain language
exclusionary rule was of considerable significance; in many of
these cases the dissenters, relying on legislative history and estab61
lished administrative interpretations, arrived at a contrary result.

The plain language cases premised the exclusion of all other considerations on an almost strident insistence that there was only
one conceivable interpretation of the language in question. Thus
in Patterson, the Court insisted that an interpretation of section
1981 less parsimonious than its own would be "tortuous,"
"strain[ed]," and "twist[ed]. "6 Elsewhere, Justice Scalia and Chief
Justice Rehnquist have argued that interpretations with which they

56' 465 U.S. 555, 571 (1984).
57 490 U.S. 755, 767 (1989).
58 Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 172 (1989). Betts cited a
similar passage in McMann. "[L]egislative history ...
by traditional canons of interpretation is irrelevant to an unambiguous statute." United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434
U.S. 192, 199 (1977).
59 &e, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
60 Betts, 492 U.S. at 171.
61 West Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 152-53 (1991) (legislative
history); Betts, 492 U.S. at 189, 191 (legislative history): id. at 192-93 (administrative interpretation); Patterson, 491 U.S. at 206-07 (legislative history); Grove City College v. Bell,
465 U.S. 555, 583-92 (1984) (legislative history); McMann, 434 U.S. at 211-19 (legislative
history); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 155-58 (1976) (administrative interpretation).
62 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 181, 183, 210.
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disagreed "torture"' and were "butchering"" the statutory language, revealing a compassion for the mistreatment of words that
they do not necessarily exhibit when faced with physical abuse of
incarcerated human beings.'s
In each of these cases, however, Congress has emphatically
declared that the result arrived at by this methodology was mistaken. The lesson of the corrective legislation is that not only the
holding in these cases, but their underlying methodology as well,
were fatally flawed. The "plain language" cases, like the disasters at
Gallipoli, Dieppe, and Dien Bien Phu, are important as illustrations of errors to be avoided in the future. In a number of instances, it is possible to ascertain why the majority's reading of the
text was not only overconfident, but also wrong.
Most fundamentally, none of the interpretations proffered by
the so-called plain language cases would be described, at least by a
person speaking ordinary English, as "clear" or "plain" on the face
of the statutory text. In the case of Patterson, for example, the
statute confers on nonwhites "the same right ...
to make and
enforce contracts ... as whites. "66 Yet, the Patterson majority held
-that the "plain" meaning of the text prohibits: (1) discrimination
in hiring, but not discrimination in transfers, layoffs or dismissals;67 (2) hiring an individual with an intent to engage in racial
harassment, but not racial harassment itself,' (3) discrimination
in promotion to a position involving, a "new and distinct relationship", but not in other promotions; 69 (4) the raci based refusal
of a union to process a grievance, but not a race based decision
by the employer to reject that grievance.7" Whatever might be
said for this exposition of the requirements of section 1981, no
one would say that any of these distinctions were "plain" on the
face of the statute.
The problem with these overturned cases was not that they
misread the plain meaning of the statutory language at issue, but

63
64
ing).
65
ing).
66
67
68
69
70

North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 541 (1982) (dissenting opinion).
American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465, 2477 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissentSee, eg., Hudson v. McMillan, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1005 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissent42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
Patterson, 491 U.S. at 178-79.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 177.
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that the meaning of the statutory language was not plain in the
first place, and that any interpretation that purported to find such
a plain meaning was thus a likely prescription for error. Although
the routes taken by the majority to that error varied, the dissenting opinions in these cases consistently and correctly insisted that
the terms of the laws simply were not clear enough to be dispositive. 71 Justice Marshall correctly observed in Betts, "only so much
blood can be squeezed from the textual stone;" 72 even the majority opinion in Betts acknowledged that there comes a point at
which a textual argument "requires us to read a great deal into
the language." 5 It stretches credulity to suggest that Congress, if
it actually considered and resolved some issue, would then have
"decided it would drop coy hints but stop short of making its
intention manifest."74 In other circumstances, Justice Kennedy
correctly observed that "[s]crutiny of the placement of commas
will not, in the final analysis, yield a convincing answer." 75 The
plain language cases use just such scholastic niceties to find meaning not readily apparent to others, including, presumably, to Congress.
By ordinary standards of clarity none of the statutes in the
plain language cases was clear at all. If the phrase "plain meaning"
is given its ordinary meaning, its absence is decisively demonstrated in most instances by the mere fact that the meaning of a statute is a matter of serious controversy. In most of the "plain language" cases the interpretation advocated by the majority was
defiantly inconsistent with the manner in which the supposedly
unambiguous language had been interpreted by numerous courts

71 See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 209 (1979) (Marshall, J.
dissenting) ("In my view, the statutory language is susceptible of at least two interpretations").

72 Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 187 (1989) (dissenting
opinion).
73 Id at 173.
74 Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989).
75 Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881, 1892 (1992) (concurring opinion).
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of appeals, 76 by federal agencies,77 by Congress, 8 and even by
earlier Supreme Court majorities, all of whom were entirely conversant in the English *language. All such earlier authorities could
conceivably be mistaken in a given case, and a reading of the
statutory language might indeed help to reveal that error, but
where the Court chooses to adopt an interpretation repeatedly
rejected by others, it cannot plausibly assert that the language
supporting its own conclusion is unambiguous.
It would indeed be surprising if many of the statutory interpretation cases decided by the Supreme Court did involve crystal
clear statutory text. Geiuinely unambiguous language is unlikely to
give rise to the sort of dispute and intercircuit conflict which lead
the Supreme Court to agree to hear a case. The volumes of U.S.
Reports are in fact filled primarily with cases in which the Court
was required to interpret statutes whose meaning, with regard to
the question at issue, was not genuinely clear. Of course, there are
with regard to any statute numerous conceivable questions of statutory meaning which Congress addressed specifically and clearly in
language whose meaning is self-evident to all. But a litigant who
questioned the meaning of genuinely unambiguous language (e.g.
who argued Title VII does not apply to sex discrimination) would
risk being subject to sanctions under Rule 11.
The legislative history .of the 1991 Civil Rights Act illustrates
some of the reasons why questions of statutory interpretation can
and often do arise for which the statutory language in fact does
not provide a plain and unambiguous answer.
First, it is utterly beyond the ability of Congress to foresee all,
or perhaps even most, of the circumstances in which a proposed
piece of legislation will be applied. To be sure, Congress ordinarily
acts with some paradigm application in mind, with regard to
which Congress has indeed made a decision as to what outcome
the law should dictate. But under Title VII, as under most statutes,
the courts are at times called upon to resolve an issue of statutory

76 Belts, 492 U.S. at 182-3 (dissenting opinion) ("the majority casts aside the estimable wisdom of all five Courts of Appeal" to consider the issue); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S.
755, 762 (1985) (acknowledging 'the great majority of the Federal Courts of Appeals"
have adopted a contrary interpretation); Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 590
(1984) (dissenting opinion) (citing appellate decisions); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 147 (1976) (dissenting opinion) (majority "rejects the unanimous conclusion of all six Courts of Appeals that have addressed this question").
77 See supra text accompanying note 61.
78 See infra text accompanying notes 263-66.
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interpretation where "[t]here is no evidence that Congress gave
the question... any thought at all."7' Title VII applies to over
100 million employees working for several million employers, and
has now been in effect for over a quarter of a century. The law
has been and will continue to be invoked in countless circumstances Congress could never have anticipated-not because the
circumstances are bizarre, but because Congress simply does not
have the time to sit down and attempt to hypothesize every type
of situation to which Title VII or any other law might apply."
In 1990-1991, Congress became embroiled in an effort to do
this with regard to a single provision of the Civil Rights Act, until
all sides agreed that the task was inherently impossible. The 1989
decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio 1 had altered the definition of the "business necessity" required to justify a practice
with an adverse impact on minorities or women. When Congress
undertook to write a provision setting out a definition of business
necessity, different factions within Congress and the Administration, as well as interested groups, attempted to anticipate the various types of employment practices to which the law could apply.
An ongoing effort was then made to write into the specific terms
of the bill the disposition of each such possible application. There
were, on the whole, few disagreements about how particular hypothesized examples should be resolved. After a year of endless
tinkering, however, Congress abandoned the task as impossible, in
part because one side or another was always able to imagine yet
another possible application that had not been addressed clearly,
or in its view fairly, by the then current draft.82
Second, it often is not feasible to write into the terms of a
statute the disposition even of all the questions which Congress
has in fact considered. When it adopts a statute which it knows
will be applied, for example, in a hundred different circumstances,
it is often impracticable for Congress to frame a hundred section
bill describing each such case and the agreed upon outcome. To
be sure, Congress does in fact enact legislation of enormous

79 Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 743-44 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80 See,e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992) (concept
and application of "trade dress" under Federal Trade Act); Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v.
William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 112 S. Ct. 2447 (1992) (various combinations of circumstances
in which state might seek to impose tax on out of state corporation).
81 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
82

137 CONG. REC. S15239-01

(daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991)

REc. S15463 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (Sen. Kassenbaum).

(Sen. Gorton); 137 CONG.
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length and specificity, of which the Internal Revenue Code is but
one example. But at some point Congress must stop and look for
general language which, although not pinpointing the outcome in
every possible application, fits as well as words can the pattern of
results which the Congress has in mind. In dealing with the definition of business necessity, for example, Congress generally agreed
that it wished to codify the case law that existed prior to the
Wards Cove decision. There were, however, several- hundred preWards Cove decisions utilizing a business necessity standard. Leaving aside the differences among those decisions, a year of unsuccessful legislative drafting demonstrated the impracticality of finding any manageable combination of words that encompassed with
precision the specific holdings of all of those cases.
Third, much of the legislative drafting process is in a sense
defensive. The first step, difficult in itself, is to find statutory language that at least fits the first paradigmatic case which Congress,
or the sponsors, have in mind. What follows is a process of attempting to imagine other circumstances in which the law might
be applied, and of assessing whether the language used might
inadvertently lead to an unintended or counterproductive result.
At the very end of congressional consideration of the 1991 Civil
Rights Act, for example, after countless drafts and innumerable
meetings, and following final agreement between the Administration and congressional supporters of the legislation, an unknown
lawyer at the EEOC for the first time noticed that the agreed
upon text (indeed, every previous draft as well) had been written
in such a way as to imply that the EEOC, unlike private plaintiffs,
could not seek damage awards on behalf of individuals injured by
intentional discrimination.' A last minute letter called the attention of the Senate to the problem, and the bill was promptly
amended by unanimous agreement. That problem could easily
have been missed, however, just as other possibly unintended
implications undoubtedly were not recognized by Congress in the
wording of this and most other statutes. Precisely because it is
impossible for Congress to anticipate all the questions that will ultimately arise regarding the meaning of a law, it is impossible for
Congress to assure that the text of the law is free from unintended implications for some unanticipated circumstance. Thus, an

83 137 CONG. REc. S15329-30 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1991)
Chairman of the EEOC); id. at S15362 (Sen. Kennedy).

(letter from Evan Kemp,
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undue emphasis on interpreting solely the language of a statute
runs not only a risk of being a search for a nonexistent answer,
but also a risk that the search will appear to find an answer that
was quite the opposite of what Congress intended.
Given the inescapable, and understandable, ambiguity in the
statutory language at issue in the plain language cases, it is at first
blush difficult to understand how the majority could ever have
asserted that language was actually quite unambiguous. Undoubtedly, reasonable people could disagree about the meaning of a
statute, or any other written document, and faced with ambiguous
language, could interpret it differently. It is not necessarily surprising that a majority of the Court, faced with such language, might
on occasion interpret it incorrectly. But how could the Court, in
making such an error, have repeatedly insisted that the meaning
of the law was actually "plain"? And how could the majority have
described as "unambiguous" language regarding the meaning of
which other members of the Court obviously disagreed? In ordinary English a word or sentence about the meaning of which
there is such a substantial dispute virtually by definition cannot be
described as "plain" or "unambiguous."
The answer is that the majority opinions in these and other
cases were not speaking ordinary English when they described the
statutory language as plain and unambiguous. They emphatically
were not asserting that any person of normal intelligence and
fluent in the English language would readily recognize that the
laws involved had the particular meaning endorsed by the Court.
An ordinary reader would certainly not describe any .of these interpretations as plain, obvious, or perhaps even explicable.
One would miss the significance of these decisions, and of the
legislation overturning them, by simply dismissing the majority
opinions-as did some members of Congress-as anti-civil
M As used by the majority in these cases, words like "plain"
rights."
and "unambiguous" are terms of art. They refer to the result of a
process of legal reasoning, a method (or several methods) of analysis which starts with the text of the statute and arrives at a particular meaning. Such statutes are asserted to be "clear" by analogy
to the sense in which Beowuf, although unintelligible to modem
readers, is plain and unambiguous to professors of Middle English.

84 See, e.g, 137 CONG. REC. H3876-01, (daily ed. June 4, 1991) (Rep. Owen); i& at
H3851 (Rep. Conyers); id at H3859 (Rep. Hughes); id. at H3865 (Rep. DeFazio); id. at
H3866 (Rep. Kennedy); id. at H3889 (Rep. Collins); id. at H3853 (Rep. Hoyer).
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What occurred in these cases, however, was not some sort of technical translation. There are some statutes-the Internal Revenue
Code, for example-which are indeed written using technical
terms or phrases well understood by the drafters, lawyers, and
other experts, but quite opaque to anyone else. When a court
interprets such statutes the process is indeed closely analogous to
interpreting a foreign language, and a law meaningless to laymen
might in fact be crystal clear to any law school graduate. But the
statutes at issue in Patterson, Betts, McMann, and West Virginia Hospitals did not iivolve such technical terms, and even to attorneys
the language at issue was not unambiguous-if by unambiguous
we mean that virtually every lawyer would readily have agreed what
those laws meant.
A variety of ideological and philosophical concerns have at
times driven the Court to "find" plain meaning in statutory language which everyone else could see full well was unclear. It is
perhaps part of the conceit of the law to believe that some principles of statutory construction, like a form of cryptography, can be
used to detect meaning, even- obvious meaning, in passages that
confound others. Where no meaning indeed exists, however, the
invocation of those principles gives a misleading appearance of serious analysis to a process that is essentially nonsensical. The manipulation of such rules to find "plain meaning" in opaque statutes .is like using tarot cards to predict the future. The actual
analyses in the plain language cases illustrate the inherent problems when the Court insists upon finding textual meaning -where
it may in fact not exist.
Patterson v. McLean Credit Unions demonstrates that unreliable results can follow if the Court insists on attaching excessive
significance to a choice of terminology that Congress itself may
never have regarded as significant. The statute at issue in Patterson
prohibited
racial
discrimination
in
the
"mak[ing]
and
6
enforc[ment]" of contracts. As Justice Stevens noted in his dissenting opinion, the most lifteral interpretation of the law would
7
have covered virtually all acts of employment discrimination.
The plaintiff in Patterson, like most American workers, had no
written or oral contract for a fixed period of time, but was an at
will employee. In an at will employment relation, every day is a

85
86
87

491 U.S. 164 (1989).
Id. at 170.
Id. at 219.
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new contract, every promotion is thus necessarily a new contract,
and a dismissal is not the revocation or violation of any existing
contract, but a refusal by the employer to enter into further day
to day contracts. 8
The Patterson majority, however, concluded that section 1981
was largely inapplicable to an employment relationship after the
employee was initially hired. 9 The linchpin of the majority's
analysis was its very first sentence, asserting, "The most obvious
feature of the provision is the restriction of its scope to forbidding
discrimination in the 'mak[ing] and enforc[ement]' of contracts
alone. Where an alleged act of discrimination does not involve the
impairment of one of these specific rights, § 1981 provides no
relief."' The phrase "make and enforce" might plausibly have
been read as all encompassing, covering whatever happened before or after the moment in time of entering into a contract. The
majority did more than merely reject this reading; it identified as
the single most important aspect of the statute the (purported)
emphatic exclusion of something-whatever is not making and
enforcement-from its coverage. From that premise all else followed. That every day is technically a new contract for an at will
employee could not matter, because if it did, virtually the entire
employment relationship would have been covered, and almost
nothing would have been excluded. The vitality of the supposed
"restriction" would be undermined if every promotion were treated
as a new contract, even if the employee literally signed a new
written contract on each such occasion; the majority therefore
limited actionable promotions to those involving a "new and distinct relation."91 Thus transformed, section 1981 protected not a
right to enter into a contract, but only a right to enter into the
first of a series of at will employment contracts and to enter into
those promotional contracts that amount to a new and distinct
relation. Patterson should be remembered as the classic example of
the errors that follow if the Court insists on assuming that a possibly casual choice of words or punctuation must be freighted with
enormous significance, without bothering to ask why Congress
would have wanted to do so.

88

Id. at 221.

89
90
91

Id. at 176.
Id.
Id. at 185.
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West Virginia University Hospitals v. Case 2 makes clear that
the reliability of any precept of construction, even as fairly applied, must be tested against the realities of the legislative process.
The issue in West Virginia Hospitals was whether the "attorney's
fees" which may be awarded under section 1988 include the cost
of expert witnesses. In holding that expert fees could not be
awarded under section 1988, the Court stressed that in thirty-four
other statutes, unlike section 1988, express provision had been
made for an award of expert witness fees. 93 One such provision,

the majority noted, had been enacted "just over a week prior to
the enactment of § 1988 ... [in] the Toxic Substances Control
Act."94 If "counsel fees" include expert fees, the Court argued,
"dozens of statutes referring to the two separately become an inThis analysis is certainly
explicable exercise in redundancy."'
plausible, yet Congress promptly signaled that West Virginia Hospitals too was among the wrongly decided cases to be corrected.
The error here was in giving conclusive weight to this comparison of statutory language. The majority never exactly explained
why it was dispositive of the construction of section 1988 that
thirty-four other laws list counsel fees and expert fees separately.
Had Congress enacted those provisions and section 1988 in a
single thirty-five section law, those other provisions would be very
instructive. But the opinion in West Virginia Hospitals does not suggest that Congress was actually aware of all or any of those other
laws when it enacted section 1988. Justice Scalia's law clerkscertainly deserve credit for having found those other statutes, but
members of the House and Senate do not spend their days running every proposed statutory term and phrase through LEXIS,
and it is unlikely that any member of either body had any idea
how the words "counsel fees" and "expert fees" had been used in
other statutes. The particular example emphasized by the Court,
the Toxic Substances Control Act, illustrates the practical irrelevance of this sort of analysis. That Act, which encompasses fortyeight pages in Statutes at Large, was passed along with the amendment to section 1988 in the 1976 end of session rush of legislation.' It is exceedingly unlikely that any member of Congress, or

92 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991).
93 Id. at 1142.
94 Id. at 1141.
95 Id at 1143.
96 Within a week of the enactment, on October 19, 1976, of section 1988, Congress
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any congressional staff worker, ever undertook a line by line comparison of these two bills, or of the scores of others on the floor,
to look for similarities and differences in the way they had been
drafted.
Public Employees Retirement System v. Betts" makes clear that
otherwise sensible principles of statutory construction are dangerously susceptible to manipulation and abuse. The problem in Betts
was how to reconcile two provisions of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. 9 Section 4(a)(1) forbids an employer "to...
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's age.""° Section 4(f)(2), on the other hand,
provides that it is not unlawful for an employer "to observe the
terms of ... any bona fide employee benefit plan, such as a re-

tirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to
evade the purpose of this chapter.""' The majority, invoking the
principle that no section of a statute should be construed in a way
that renders it "nugatory,"11 2 held that essentially all benefit
plans were exempt from section 4(a)(1) because "the alternative
interpretation would eviscerate § 4(f) (2)."" The palpable defect
in this argument, as the dissent noted, was that there were a variety of possible alternatives to the majority's interpretation.1 4 The
only alternative considered by the majority-that all benefit plans
which make any distinctions based on age would be outside the
protection of section 4(f)(2) and thus unlawful-would indeed
have nullified that section. 5 But the alternative construction
long advocated by the EEOC, and ultimately codified in the stat-

enacted a total of 90 statutes. See 90 Stat. 2498-2693 (1976).
97 Even the plausible argument that the § 1988 amendment and the Toxic Substances Control Act were enacted within a week of one another ignores congressional realities.
The bills were actually considered on the floor of the House and Senate at more remote
points in the legislative process. The Senate, for example, first approved the Toxic Substances Control Act on March 26, 1976, and passed the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act on September 29, 1976, the day after it approved the conference report on
the Toxic Substances Control Act. S. REP. No. 698, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 5908.
98 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
99 Id at 161.

100 29 U.S.C. § 623(A)(1) (1988).
101 § 623(f)(2).
102 Bets, 492 U.S. at 177.
103 1d. (emphasis added).
104 Id.at 186-89 (dissenting opinion).
105 Id.at 177.
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ute overturning Betts, had no such impact, protecting and permitting under section 4(f) (2) benefit plans making distinctions based
on age where those distinctions are related to the higher cost of
providing benefits to older workers. Conversely, the majority's view
rendered the subterfuge clause of section 4(f)(2) meaningless by
limiting it to circumstances so peculiar as unlikely ever to occur ori
to have been what Congress had in mind-such as the chimerical
case in which an employer rewrites its entire benefit plan for the
purpose of retaliating against a single employee for having filed an
ADEA complaint."° In sum, application of the unexceptionable
principle that a statutory provision should be construed to have
some real meaning depends very much on what alternatives a
court hypothesizes and how it evaluates them. This and other precepts of statutory construction are not objective mechanical rules;
their application requires a considerable degree of judgment and
thus is capable of abuse.
Finally, United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann01 7 demonstrates how
misdirected cleverness can find in a statute a plain meaning Congress never intended. The statute at issue in McMann was the part
of the ADEA, quoted above, regarding bona fide benefit plans.
The majority in McMann concluded that section 4(f) (2) exempted
from coverage by the ADEA all benefit plans adopted before the
enactment of that law, even though an identical postenactment
plan might be illegal."' 8 Noting that section 4(f) (2) denied exemption to a plan that was "a subterfuge to evade the purposes of
this [Act],'

the Court held that there could be no distinction

between a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the law and a
subterfuge to evade the law itself. The Court stated, "The distinction ...

is untenable because the Act is the vehicle by which its

purposes are expressed and carried out; it is difficult to conceive
of a subterfuge to evade the one which does not also evade the
other."1 Having thus transformed the language of the law from
"subterfuge to evade the purpose of this [Act]' into "subterfuge to
evade this"Act", the rest of the analysis was easy. The Court continued, "So read, a plan established in 1941 . ..

cannot be a sub-

106 Id at 180. The dissenting opinion correctly described these applications as purely
"hypothetical." Id at 184 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
107 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
108

Id. at 203.

109
110

Id at 192.
Id at 198.
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terfuge to evade an act passed 26 years later. To spell out an
intent in 1941 to evade a statutory requirement not enacted until
1967 attributes, at the very least, a remarkable prescience to the
employer.""' It is not difficult to see the flaw in this analysis.
"Evade the purpose of the Act" does not mean "evade the Act." It
is true that a plan whose purpose was to evade the purpose of the
Act would ordinarily have the effect of evading the Act itself, but
that is not to say that the two types of evasive motive are identical.
A 1941 plan denying medical benefits to anyone who was a grandparent would be a subterfuge to discriminate against older workers
even though it would not have been adopted as a subterfuge to
evade an as yet nonexistent law.
The action of Congress in overturning these decisions makes
clear that it is important that courts not ignore other traditional
sources for interpreting a statute merely because they may think
the cold language of the statute itself "plain" or "unambiguous."
Learned Hand repeatedly cautioned that there may be "no surer
way to misread a document than to read it literally."" 2 Yet,
McMann suggests courts should consider legislative history only if
they cannot find a dictionary to resolve the question."' Similarly,,
Patterson asserts that interpretation is a mere matter of "logic or
semantics."1 4 Justice Thomas has urged the courts to simply ask
which alternative interpretation is most consistent with "correct
grammar.""' This is precisely the sort of deliberately uninformed
approach criticized by Judge Hand a generation ago:
All [legislators] have done is to write down certain words which
they mean to apply generally to situations of that kind. To
apply these literally may either pervert what was plainly their
general meaning, or leave undisposed of what there is every
reason to suppose they meant to provide for. Thus it is not
enough for the judge just to use a dictionary. If he should do
no more, he might come out with a result which every sensible
man would recognize to be quite the opposite of what was
intended; which would contradict or leave unfulfilled its plain

111

I& at 203.

112 Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944) (concurring opinion), af'd
sub noa. Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945).
113 McMann, 434 U.S. at 203.
114 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 177 (1989).
115 Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881, 1900 (1992) (dissenting opinion).
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A century ago the Supreme Court, citing a long line of federal,
state, and English decisions, admonished that the courts should
not blindly apply the literal language of a statute in circumstances
where other circumstances demonstrate that the result could have
been intended by Congress:
It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the
statute and yet not within the statute, because notwithin its
spirit nor within the intention of its makers. This has been
often asserted, and the Reports are full of cases illustrating its
application. This is not the substitution of the will of the judge
for that of the legislator; for frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to include an
act in question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of
the absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the
legislator intended to include the particular act." 7
That the Court's "plain language" methodology has become
consciously unrelated to the actual wishes of Congress is increasingly evident from the Court's opinions. In some passages the
1977 decision in McMann at least purported to be about congressional intent. The Court's proposed definition of "subterfuge" was
followed by the comment, "we must assume Congress intended it
in that sense.""' After setting out its own narrow interpretation
of the statute, the McMann majority opinion added, "we find nothing to indicate .Congress intended" a broader reach of the law.1 9
But the Court's more recent cases often lack even a pretense that
Congress would have wanted the result reached by the majority.
Rather, these decisions seem to describe a process in which Congress, quite possibly unaware of the significance of its actions, had
chosen words which convey a special "plain language" meaning
which the courts then decipher and apply. It is as though, to use
a phrase coined by Justice Scalia in a noncivil rights case, Congress had inadvertently used in a statute the words of a "cleverly
crafted code" 2 ' which only the Courts understood. On this view
116 LEARNED HAND, How FAR IS A JUDGE FREE IN RENDERING A DECISION? in THE
SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 103, 106 (Irving Dillard ed., 1952).
117 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
118
119

MeMann, 434 U.S. at 203.
Id. at 203.
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American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465, 2478 (1992) (dissenting opin-
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the actual intent of Congress in using a particular term would be
as irrelevant to the Court as was the intent of You Bet Your Life
contestants who happened to utter "the magic word" to Groucho
Marx. Thus in Patterson, the Court insisted that "our role is limited
to interpreting what Congress ...

has done,""'

not what Con-

gress may have meant. In West Virginia Hospitals the Court held,
not that Congress intended the counsel fee statute at issue not to
encompass expert witnesses, but that counsel fees and witness fees
simply "are" separate items." The majority explained:
Where a statutory term presented to us for the first time is
ambiguous, we construe it to contain that permissible meaning
which fits most logically and comfortably into the body of both
previously and subsequently enacted law ....

We do so not

because that precise accommodative meaning is what the lawmakers must have had in mind . .. but because it is our role

to make sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus ju-

2
ris. 3

This passage suggests that congressional intent might henceforth
be irrelevant even to "ambiguous" statutes, and that to ignore such
intent the Court need only be able to find some meaning, not
necessarily a clear or plain meaning, that fits "logically and comfortably" into the law. Elsewhere Justice Scalia has suggested "plain
language" refers to the way in which words would be used by a
legislator who understood "the
agreed-upon methodology for creat124
ing and interpreting text."

The Court's plain language cases have also been openly indifferent as to whether the results of that methodology made a great
deal of sense. Where the meaning of the relevant statutory language was unambiguous, the majority insisted in West Virginia University Hospitals, it was simply irrelevant whether that interpretation
advanced or frustrated the purpose of the statute.1 25 The role of
the Court was limited, Patterson explained, to ascertaining "what

ion). In this case Justice Scalia was objecting to the use of prior cases to determine the
meaning of words used in a later statute, precisely the methodology that Justice Scalia
himself had embraced only a year earlier in West Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 111 S.
Ct. 1138, 1144 (1991).
121 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 188 (1989).
122 Casey, 111 S. Ct. at 1141 (emphasis added).
123 Id. at 1148.
124 Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2250 (1992) (concurring opinion). Who
agreed with whom upon such a methodology other than perhaps Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, is unclear.
125 Casey, 111 S. Ct. at 1147.
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Congress... has done" 2 ' through its choice of words; whether
Congress might actually have intended the statute, and those
words, to do was of no apparent significance. Thus, Patterson held
that the 1866 Civil Rights Act required an employer to hire without regard to race, but permitted an employer to then harass,
demote and dismiss employees on the basis of race. 127 It is quite
difficult to imagine why any Congress would have intended such a
bizarre and self-defeating system, which, according to the Court,
expressly authorized employers to engage in practices that would
effectively nullify the statute. In Grove City College v. Bell,'12 the
Court, interpreting the Title IX prohibition against discrimination
in federally assisted programs, held that a school which awarded
federally funded scholarships could discriminate against the federal
scholarship recipient-excluding her, for example, from all classes
except cooking and dressmaking-but could not discriminate in29
awarding to other students scholarships from other sources.
Because of its statutory construction methodology, the majority saw
no reason to explain why Congress would have wanted such a
peculiar result."s
It is the very impossibility of an actual "plain language" interpretation of many statutes which may make that technique so
alluring to some members of the Supreme Court. The task is
often impossible in the sense that no objective form of analysis
would yield any unambiguous answer, but that also means that no
objective analysis constrains the majority when it purports to announce the plain meaning of a statute. Of course, if the plain
meaning*of the text were only one of several factors considered in
statutory interpretation, this would not be so serious. But the
Court has increasingly although erratically insisted not merely that
plain meaning is the most important consideration, but that whenever plain meaning can be found the Court is forbidden to consider anything else. The use of plain meaning to preclude consideration of other factors-legislative history, the purpose of the law,
the unfairness or irrationality of the result-is of decisive impor-

126
127
128

Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 188 (1989).
Id.
465 U.S. 555 (1984).

129 Id. at 574-75.
10 See also Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 112 S. Ct. 2589, 2598 (1992)
(Court's interpretation admittedly "stark," "troubling," "a trap for the unwary," and "a
powerful tool to employers who resist liability under the Act," "[b]ut Congress has spo-

ken with great clarity.").
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tance. It assures that a finding of plain meaning, no matter how
far fetched and marginal, is always dispositive because it never has
to be assessed against any other consideration. Because all such
considerations are automatically irrelevant, it simply does not matter whether the purported "plain meaning" serves no "plausible
statutory purpose."iM The result resembles nothing so much as a
criminal trial in which evidence can be introduced only if the
judge is unable to determine guilt or innocence by reading the
morning's tea leaves. It is a system which confers on any majority
the power to give any meaning it wishes to a statute, without having to pay any heed to the purposes or wishes of Congress. For a
conservative Court constantly at odds with the policies of a more
moderate Congress, such a scheme of judicial empowerment is of
obvious allure.
The legislative history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act demonstrates yet another danger in the approach taken by the majority
in cases like Patterson, a new problem that has arisen precisely because of the way the Court often attempts to find an answer in
statutory language and thus deliberately ignore legislative history.
Members of Congress have two ways to comprehend what they are
voting for or against-a reading of the terms of the legislation
itself, and reliance on the explanations of the legislation offered
by its supporters and opponents, its legislative history. Under the
approach to statutory interpretation advocated by Justice Scalia,
and occasionally others, the terms of a statute may now be read to
have a "plain meaning" that ordinary mortals-e.g., members of
the House and Senate-could not perceive, as a consequence of
which the legislative history is then deemed irrelevant. This approach, as was noted above, often accords the Court virtually
standardless discretion to give a statute virtually any meaning it
pleases. Equally serious, it spawns legitimate fear of Trojan Horse
legislation, ambiguous and benign sounding proposals which the
proponents hope and intend a court will construe in a way that
they realize full well Congress would never knowingly approve and
which is therefore deliberately denied or at least obscured during
the legislative process. Prior to the advent of the Scalia approach
this could not easily have succeeded because a review of the legislative history and explanation of the bill would have led the Court
to reject any such covert meaning. But now a proponent of such a
proposal can mischaracterize it on the floor of the House or Sen-

131

Id. at 2602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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ate, confident that Justice Scalia and others-unlike members of
those bodies-will ignore those representations.
The legislative history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act contains
several illustrations of this problem. With regard to the statutory
definition of business necessity, for example, proponents of the
Administration bills insisted that they, like the supporters of the
majority proposals, favored a return to the pre-Wards Cove definition of business necessity.13 2 . They denied charges that the Ad-

ministration bills would have the effect, indeed had the purpose,
of codifying the Wards Cove standard."
Subsequent developments confirmed that the Administration definition was in fact a
Trojan Horse proposal to codify, rather than overturn, Wards Cove
Once compromise language was agreed upon, and further changes
were impossible, Administration supporters openly proclaimed that
codification of Wards Cove-was in fact their goal, and announced
their hope that the compromise text would be interpreted to have
just such a result."M Conversely, although proponents of the earlier versions of the bill insisted they sought only to restore preWards Cove law, conservatives expressed fears that the language of
these versions, perhaps deliberately, went far beyond mere restora1 55

tion.

The so-called plain language approach followed in Patterson
and similar cases would, in the final analysis, work a fundamental
change in the constitutional allocation of power between the three
branches of the federal government. As written, Article I of the
U.S. Constitution provides that "[a]ll legislative powers .. . shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States."136 Increasingly,
the Court has acted as if Article I said something like "all legislative powers, on any subject regarding which a statute has been
adopted, shall be vested in the courts, unless that law has been

132 137 CONG. REc. H3885 (daily ed. June 4, 1991) (Sen. Gunderson); id. at H3871
(Sen. Orton); idt at H3875 (Rep. Gradison); id at H3903 (Rep. Franks); 137 CONG. REC.
S3021-02 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1991) (Sen. Dole); id. at S3026 (Dept. of Justice letter); id.
at S3027 (Sen. McCain); 137 CONG. REC. S2260 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1991) (Sen. Simpson).
133 137 CONG. REc. S8990 (daily ed. June 27, 1991) (Sen. Durenberger); 137 CONG.
REC. H3851 (daily ed. June 4, 1991) (Rep. Conyers); id. at H3869 (Rep. Edwards); id. at
H3888 (Rep. Towns).
134 137 CONG. REc. H9545 (daily ed. Nov. 11, 1991) (memorandum of Rep. Hyde);
137 CONG. REc. S15474 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (memorandum of Senator Dole).
135 See, eg., 137 CONG. REc. H3944 (dail9 ed. June 4, 1991) (statement by Rep.
Stenholm); 137 CONG. REc. S2259 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1991) (statement by Sen.-Simpson);
id. at H3930 (statement by Rep. Hyde); id. at H3932 (statement by Rep. Goodling).
136 U.S. CONsr. art. 1, § 1.
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written so clearly as to utterly preclude a particular judicial interpretation." For a conservative Supreme Court, at odds with the
policies of a more moderate Congress and Executive, such a constitutional provision would be undeniable attractive, but it certainly
is not what the framers, or the plain language of Article I itself,
provided.
The first lesson of the corrective statutes is that the concept
of "plain language" should be limited to what would be plain and
unambiguous to an ordinary reader, such as above all, a member
of Congress. Only a meaning that would have been obvious to an
ordinary member of Congress-not law clerks who run a Lexis
search on every word and phrase or who search for hidden meaning in the interstices and interrelationships of each clause-should
be regarded as dispositive. Measured by this standard, very few
cases coming before the Supreme Court will qualify. If lower court
judges, executive branch agencies, or the Supreme Court's own
prior opinions read or applied a law in a manner inconsistent
with an asserted "plain meaning," that meaning simply cannot be
characterized as plain, clear or unambiguous. A meaning not obvious to virtually all judges and agency officials cannot possibly have
been obvious to the members of the House and Senate who enacted a statute.
II.

PRESUMPTUOUS PRESUMPTIONS

Another group of overturned decisions was based on a different rationale for largely disregarding evidence of congressional
intent. Here the methodology was almost the opposite of the plain
meaning cases. These decisions begin by recognizing a strong
presumption in favor of the result favored by the majority, and
then profess to find that statute at issue insufficiently clear to
overcome that presumption; in several instances the Court ruled
congressional intent unclear only after expressly refusing to consider any evidence of intent contained in the relevant legislative
history. In other instances the presumption created is so strong
that most evidence of congressional intent could not be sufficient
enough to overcome it. The same Justices who in cases such as
Patterson easily discovered startling clarity in the least soupcon of
textual nicety were, when invoking one of these presumptions,
totally baffled as to the meaning of seemingly straightforward
statutory language.
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Two of these decisions, Dellmuth v. Muth3 7 and Atascadero
State Hospital v. Scanlon,"s concerned the availability of monetary
relief against a state agency. Dellmuth held that such relief could
not be awarded under the Education of the Handicapped Act. 139
Atascadero reached the same conclusion regarding the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which forbids recipients of federal funds from
discriminating on the basis of disability."° Both cases relied on
the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment decisions, which by the
mid-1980's had established a presumption against the availability of
monetary relief against a state agency. Although the reigning substantive interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment has itself been
widely criticized, the presumption spawned by that interpretation
has been of greater practical impact.
Atascadero explained that the presumption was rooted in a
desire to remove all doubt about congressional intent: "[I]t is
incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain of Congress' intent before finding that federal law overrides the guarantees of
the Eleventh Amendment. The requirement that Congress unequivocally express this intention in the statutory language ensures such
certainty." 4' The Rehabilitation Act authorized monetary and
other relief against "any recipient of Federal assistance", 42 but
the Court held that this "general authorization," which of course
literally included a state recipient, did not constitute the needed
"unequivocal
statutory
language." 143
Congress
overturned
Atascadero within a year.'"
Dellmuth established an even more stringent standard. The
Dellmuth Court stated, "Lest Atascadero be thought to contain any
ambiguity, we reaffirm today that in this area of the law, evidence
of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual ....

Legislative history generally will be irrelevant to a judicial

inquiry into whether Congress intended to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment." M The majority dismissed as irrelevant the fact

137 491 U.S. 223 (1989).
138 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
139 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1988).
140 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
141 Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 243 (emphasis added); see also id. at 242 ("unmistakably
dear.").
142 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1988).
143 Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246.
144 Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, § 1003, 100 Stat. 1807 (1986) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a) (1988)).
145 Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989).
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that in 1975, when the statute at issue had been enacted, Congress
could not have known of the need for a special textual reference
to state immunity, because the requirement had only been fashioned by the Court years later. "[T]he salient point," the majority
explained, was "it cannot be said with perfect confidence"1 4 that
Congress intended to subject the states to suit. In the absence of
such perfect confidence, a statute would be construed as not authorizing suits against a state even though the most plausible reading of the statutory language authorized just such suits. Dellmuth
too was promptly set aside by Congress. 4 The presumption in
Atascadero and Dellmuth is particularly harsh because it cannot be
satisfied merely by demonstrating that a literal reading of the statutory text---e.g. "any" recipient-would encompass a state. The
statutory language will be deemed sufficient, it appears, only if it
specifically mentions the Eleventh Amendment, state sovereign
immunity or lawsuits against states. These decisions at bottom, are
not efforts to discern congressional intent, but an insistence that
congressional intent is to be ignored, and thus frustrated, unless
expressed in a particular way.
The Supreme Court decided EEOC v. Arabian American Oil
Co."~ ("Aramco") by increasing the stringency of the presumption
against extraterritorial application of federal laws. The question in
Aramco was whether, as EEOC had long maintained, Title VII applied to the treatment of American citizens by American firms
doing business abroad. 14' Aramco retains a patina of concern with
congressional intent, asserting that its "canon of construction ...
is a valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional intent may
be ascertained.""' However, the test for discerning such an expressed congressional intent, Aramco held, was whether Congress
had made "a clear statement" that the law applied overseas.151 In
other words, a semi-clear or middling or not-quite-decisive statement that a law does apply overseas has a perverse effect of com-

146 Id. at 231; see also i& ("unmistakable clarity" required"); id. at 232 ("unequivocal
declaration").
147 Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, sec. 103, § 604, 104
Stat. 1103, 1106 (1990) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. § 1403 (West Supp. 1993)).
148 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
149 I& at 1229.
150 Id. at 1230 (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
151 Id. at 1229.
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pelling the conclusion that the unexpressed intent of Congress was
precisely the opposite. Unlike the Atascadero and Dellmuth presumption, which would only be satisfied with certain magic words,
Aramco does not require a particular linguistic formula. Rather, the
Aramco presumption is usually conclusive because the evidence
sufficient to overcome it must be especially weighty and compelling. 11 2 In Aramco, as in Delmuth, legislative history was deemed
inherently insufficient to overcome the presumption, a critical part
of the decision in Aramco because the legislative history of Title
VII was in fact quite clear on this point. 5 3 Having set a stringent

standard of proof, and having excluded the dispositive evidence,
the Aramrco majority held EEOC had failed to establish that Congress intended to apply Title VII to American firms abroad.'54
Aramco was decided on March 26, 1991; legislation 55
overturning
that decision became law less than seven months later. Library of Congress v. Shaw6'5 involved the longstanding presumption against a waiver of federal sovereign immunity. However,
the statute at issue, the 1972 amendments to Title VII, indisputably did contain just such a waiver, providing that federal agencies
could be held liable for back pay, costs, and counsel fees "the
same as a private person."5 7 In a Title VII award against a private person, counsel fees are adjusted upward to take into account
the delay between when the legal services are rendered and when
the defendant pays for them. The majority in Shaw held that such
an upward adjustment was equivalent to an award of interest on
the unadjusted fee and that a separatewaiver of sovereign immunity was required as to interest awards. This additional waiver, the
Court held in language reminiscent of Delmuth and Atascadero,
must be an "express" one."s Thus, the statute in Shaw was construed to provide that plaintiffs who sue the federal government

152 Id. at 1235 ( considerations supporting extra territoriality "insufficiently weighty to
overcome the presumption"); see a/o id.at 1236 (lackiof "sufficient affirmative evidence"
to overcome presumption).
153 Id. at 1239. 1241, 1244 (dissenting opinion).
154 Id. at 1236.
155 Aramco was overturned by § 109 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, sec. 109, 105 Stat.
1071, 1077-78 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (Supp. 1992)).
156 478 U.S. 310 (1986).

157 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988).
158

Shaw, 478 U.S. at 314, 315, 317, 318.
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are to get smaller counsel fees, rather than fees that are "the
same as" awards against private defendants.
Three other cases involved the application of seemingly ad
hoc presumptions. In United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann5 9 the majority insisted that it would reject an interpretation of Title VII
which raised questions about the validity of numerous existing
benefit plans unless there was a "clear, unambiguous expression"
of congressional intent." ° In West Virginia University Hospitals v.
Casey,' ' the Court, noting that a general law originally enacted
in 1853 fixed the amount of witness fees at thirty dollars a
day,162 explained that, it would "not lightly find""6 that statutes
adopted a century later, dealing with costs and fees in particular
types of cases, had authorized expert fees in any greater amount.
Larger fees could be awarded only if other statutes invoked were
"explicit."' The majority in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union '
explained "we should be and are 'reluctant to federalize' matters
traditionally covered by state common law," such as racial harassment amounting to a breach of contract, and that it would not do
so unless "Congress plainly directs."" These decisions do not
purport to be based on any special interpretive principles governing employee benefit plans or expert witness fees; the presumptions were devised for, and apparently applied only in, McMann,
West Virginia Hospitals and Patterson respectively.
The presumptions in these cases, especially Atascadero,
Dellmuth, Shaw and Aramco, are particularly harsh. They establish a
requirement of explicitness considerably more stringent than the
degree of clarity relied on in the plain language cases. The literal
meaning of the words "any recipient" in Atascadero and "same
[remedies]" in Shaw was not sufficient to overcome the presumptions in those cases. The statutory language, Atascadero held, must
be "unmistakably clear;" 67 mere "plain language" will not do.
The sometimes complex process by which the plain language cases
159
160
161
162
163

434 U.S. 192 (1977).
Id. at 199.
111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991).
See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 440-41 (1987).
Casey, 111 S. Ct. at 1141.

164

Id

165
166
167

491 U.S. 164 (1989).
Id. at 183.
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1989).

(quoting Crawford, 482 U.S. at 439).
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divined the meaning of statutory language is unacceptable here; as
Justice Scalia observed in Aramco, "[m]ere implications from the
statutory language" will not do."6 Thus language so clear and
unambiguous that in the plain' language cases it would preclude
consideration of legislative history and purpose is nonetheless
insufficiently clear and unambiguous to overcome any of these
presumptions. Absent the requisite degree of explicitness, the
Court in a presumption case excludes from consideration even
what it would otherwise describe as the "plain meaning" of the
statutory language.
I On other occasions where the Court has utilized a presumption to interpret statutes, it often invokes the presumption only
after it has first exhausted all conceivable sources for ascertaining
the intended meaning of the law. 6' But these overturned cases
recognize an altogether different type of presumption, one which
70
effectively precludes consideration of most of those sources.
Thus these presumption cases do not seriously purport to implement the actual intent of Congress. Rather, they establish
rules-like the constitutional requirement of a majority vote in
both houses-which must be met if Congress wishes to accomplish
the result disfavored by the presumption. Ataseadero admonishes,
for example, that "Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only"17 ' "when
certain specific conditions are met." 72 Unless expressed through

the special court prescribed terminology, Library of Congress v.
7 insisted, "an intent on the part if the framers of a statShad"'
ute ...

to permit the recovery of interest" is irrelevant.

74

Thus

when the dissenters in Shaw and Aramco argued the majority opin-

168 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1236 (1991) (concurring opinion).
169 See, ag., United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms, 112 S. Ct. 2102, 2109 (1992)
(plurality opinion); id. at 2110 (concurring opinion); Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct.
1881, 1893 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring); United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867,
1878 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
170 E-g., Atwcadero, 473 U.S. at 238-39, 242.
171 Id. at 242.
172 Id. at 239.
173 478 U.S. 310 (1986).
174 Id. at 318 (quoting United States v. New York Runyon Importing Co., 329 U.S.
654, 659 (1947)).
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ion overrode or ignored congressional intent, the majority opinions made no effort to deny the charge.
If the appropriateness of presumptions in statutory construction is measured by the accuracy with which they ascertain the
intent of Congress, the lessons of the corrective legislation are
easy to divine. The so-called Eleventh Amendment presumption
should be abolished; tested by actual experience, that presumption
has repeatedly resulted in inaccurate interpretations of federal
law.' 75 Elimination of that presumption would substantially reduce the impact of the Court's dubious construction of the Eleventh Amendment. The presumption against extraterritoriality
should be ratcheted back from the harsh "clear statement" rule,
and the presumption against waivers of sovereign immunity should
not be applied on a remedy by remedy basis. No presumption
should be so stringent that other statutory construction factors,
such as legislative history, are deemed irrelevant or are inherently
insufficient to overcome the presumption.
Above all, presumptions should only be used where there is a
firm basis in congressional reality for assuming that Congress
would likely favor or disfavor a particular result. It will not do to
say, as did some of the overturned cases, that any court created
presumption is reliable because Congress must have known it
existed. In that sense one could argue that a presumption against
applying criminal statutes to Republican office holders would be
reliable once formally announced by the courts. Nothing in the
history of these overturned decisions indicates that Congress
spends its time pursuing United States Reports or Sutherland on
Statutory Construction in search of presumptions to memorize. Judicially created presumptions are increasingly a trap for an unwary
and preoccupied Congress; they merely complicate an already
difficult legislative drafting process.
Judicial creation of new presumptions intrudes even more
seriously into the domains of Congress and produces results particularly likely to be overturned. Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion

175 In addition to Alascadero and Deilmuth, Congress overturned the decision in Employees of the Department of Public Health and Welfare v. Department of Public Health
and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973), which had held that monetary relief was not available
against state agencies for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Fair Labor Standards

Amendments of 1974, § 6, 88 Stat. 55, 58-59 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
203(d), (e) (1988)).

§
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in Aramco explained how the presumption announced and invoked
176
by the majority departed from past principles of construction.
Responding to a similar objection in Deilmuth, the majority in that
case argued the Ninety-fourth Congress had enacted the Education
of the Handicapped Act after "taking careful stock of the state of
Eleventh Amendment law." 1 " But the EHA was enacted in 1975,
a full decade before the presumption at' issue was created in
Atascadero. The adoption of such new presumptions changes, quite'
literally, the meaning of pre-existing laws. Thus the 1976 Copyright Act, construed as fully applicable to the states prior to
Atascadero, was thereafter reinterpreted to immunize state agencies
from copyright infringement actions, requiring Congress to reenact the statute to restore its original meaning.1 7 The power to
create intent-overriding presumptions is the power to rewrite any
statute at will.
The danger of abuse is starkly illustrated by the Court's recent
decisions regarding whether federal laws pre-empt state statutes;
over the course of three decisions in six days the Court, and most
of its members, changed positions as to whether to apply a presumption against pre-emption.

176 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1237-39 (1991).
177 Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989); see i. at 195; see also Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 255 n.7 (dissenting opinion) ("Vhen Congress
enacted § 504, it could have had no idea that it must obey the extreme clear-statement
rule adopted by the Court for the first time today.").
178 This history is set out in H.R. REP. No. 282, 101st Cong, 1st Sess. 2 (1989). The
Report in part states:
The legislative history of the Act makes it absolutely clear that in 1976,
Congress intended to make states fully liable for copyright infringement and
subject to all copyright remedies.
[Tihe Register of Copyrights, stated that:
. . . No- one suggested that the states were already immune from liability to
damages under the Eleventh Amendment. No state official requested total exemption from copyright liability.
Congressional intent to abrogate State sovereign immunity... was clear to
all interested parties at the time the Act was negotiated and enacted ....
Obviously, however, at the time the Act was enacted, the Congress did not have the
benefit of the Court's subsequent decisions ....
Despite the intent of Congress, . . . the Act appears insufficient to meet
the Supreme Court's test set forth in Atascadero ....
Id. at 5-6.
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Utilization of a Presumption Against Pre-Emption

Justice

Gade v. National
Wisconsin Dept. Cipollone v.
Solid Waste
of Revenue v.
Liggett
Management
Group, Inc."'
Ass'n 17 9
Wrigley Co."s

Souter
Stevens
Thomas
Kennedy
Rehnquist
O'Connor
White

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No

Blackmun

Yes

Scalia

No

No
No
No

No
-

No

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

No

The Supreme Court has suggested that at least some presumptions have a rationale avowedly unrelated to ascertaining the actual
meaning of a statute. Certain presumptions appear in effect to be
judicial presumptions against types of legislation or applications
adopted simply because the courts regard them as inherently undesirable. Thus in Hutto v. Finney,"2 Justice Powell urged the
adoption of the rule later applied in Atascadero and Delmuth on
the ground that:
[b]y making a law unenforceable against the states unless a
contrary intent were apparent in the language of the statute, the
clear statement rule ... ensure [s] that attempts to limit state

power [are] unmistakable, thereby structuring the legislative
process to allow the centrifugal forces in Congress the greatest
opportunity to protect the states' interests. 183
In an amicus brief in Atascadero, nine members of Congress rightly
objected that a presumption adopted for the purpose of impeding

179 112 S. CL 2374 (1992).
180 112 S. Ct. 2447 (1992).
181 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
182 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
183 Id at 760 n.4 (quoting Lawrence Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation,
Taxation, and Regulation Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89
HARV. L REV. 682, 695 (1976) (emphasis added)).
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legislation disagreeable to the courts would violate the separation
of powers:
On this view requiring that legislation contain a special reference to lawsuits against states is deemed desirable because it
maximizes the likelihood that the legislation will be defeated.
The structuring of the legislative process, however, is an internal matter to be regulated by the House and Senate, not by
the courts. Whether to require, permit, or curtail congressional
discussion of a particular topic is a decision which Article I
entrusts to the legislative branch."s
But the Atascadero majority promulgated its presumption as a
method of effectuating what the majority thought was the proper
"constitutional balance between the Federal Government and the
States." 8 5 The presumption in Shaw was intended to accord federal defendants a "favored position. " ss The Aramco presumption
was framed to avoid "international discord"18 7 which might follow
if federal law forbade invidious discrimination by an American
firm doing business in a country whose laws mandated that form
ta
of, abuse. In Evans v. United States,"
Justices Thomas and Scalia
and Chief Justice Rehnquist proposed yet another presumption,
this one against applying federal law to extortion by state officials,
explaining that federal prosecution of such corrupt officials was
"repugnant... to the basic tenets of federalism."8 9 Members of
the Court are entitled to adhere to whatever views they please
regarding federalism, foreign policy, or political corruption, but
when they fashion virtually irrebuttable presumptions to incorporate those views into federal statutes they surely intrude upon the
law-making function entrusted by Article I to Congress, not the
judiciary.

184 Brief Amicus Curiae In Support of Respondent on Behalf of Senator Alan
Cranston, et al. at 46.47, Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (No.
84-351).
185 Atasmdero, 473 U.S. at 238. The dissenting opinion, recalling Justice Powell's original argument, properly described the presumptions as "designed as hurdles to keep
disfavored suits out of the federal court." Id. at 254.
186 Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 315-16 (1986) (quoting United States
v. Verdier, 164 U.S. 213, 219 (1896)).
187 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1230 (1991).
188 112 S. Ct. 1881 (1992).
189 Id. at 1900 (dissenting opinion).
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CONJURED PROBLEMS AND VAMPIRE ARGUMENTS

Another group of cases did go beyond the language of the
statute to deal with possible purposes of the legislation, but erred
because the purposes relied on were those, not of the supporters
of the law, but of actual or potential opponents. In one recent
case, the Department of Justice actually went so far as to urge the
Court to treat as definitive the minority views of Senators who had
opposed the statute at issue.' The defect in these overturned
cases is somewhat more subtle. In each, the statute was construed
to solve or avoid a problem, but the problem of controlling importance was not invidious discrimination, but some hypothetical
collateral difficulty that might be caused by enactment or enforcement of the anti-discrimination legislation itself.
In Wards Cove,19' for example, the majority justified its rewriting of disparate impact principles as necessary to assure that
enforcement of those principles did not coerce employers into
adopting quotas."' The Patterson Court explained that a very narrow reading of section 1981 was needed to avoid the nullification
of the Title VII administrative processes that would occur if plaintiffs had a choice of utilizing those procedures or proceeding
directly to court under section 1981.'
Price Waterhouse, out of
concern that the law not interfere unduly with the prerogatives of
employers, declared that a supervisor who dismissed a subordinate
on account of race or sex did not violate the law if the supervisor
would also have taken the same action on some other lawful
ground.'9 4 Lorance held that protection of the expectations of
the beneficiaries of an unlawful seniority system required that chal-

190 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44 n.7 (1986).
191 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
192 After describing the circuit court's method of analyzing the statistical evidence in
the case, the Court asserted, "Such a result cannot be squared with ...
the goals behind the statute. The Court of Appeals' theory, at the very least, would mean ....
[tihe only practicable option for many employers would be to adopt racial quotas." Id. at
652; see also id. at 659; Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 993-94 (1988).
Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion in Wards Cove, described the goal of Title VII,
not as quota avoidance, but as "eliminating barriers that define economic opportunity not
by aptitude and ability but by race." Wards Cove, 487 U.S. at 662.
193 Pauerson, 491 U.S. at 173-74 (availability of § 1981 suits frustrates the objectives of
Title VII); id. at 181 (where § 1981 suit available, "the detailed procedures of Title VII
are rendered a dead letter;" restriction on § 1981 suits will "preserve the integrity of
Title Vii's procedures"); cf. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009-13 (1984).
194 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242 (invoking "[t]he statute's maintenance of employer prerogatives").
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lenges to such systems be brought long before they were ever
195
applied, or before the future victims had even been hired.
Betts 96 and McMann 97 concluded that the ADEA should be interpreted to largely exempt benefit plans from coverage because
the alternative would disrupt an unduly large number of such
plans.198
Of course, all of these decisions were overturned by Congress.
In retrospect, at least, their common flaw was that the arguments
and objections to which the Court attached controlling importance
were precisely the arguments and objections which Congress had
rejected in whole or part when it originally passed the laws at
issue. The argument that Congress should not interfere with the
prerogatives of employers, the guiding principle of Price Waterhouse,
was of course a central argument in 1964 against enactment of
Title VII. The argument in Patterson, that overlapping coverage of
Title VII and section 1981 would cause administrative problems,
had in fact been the basis in 1972 of an unsuccessful proposal to
amend Title VII to make it the exclusive remedy for employment
discrimination."9 It would have been surprising indeed if Congress had accepted these contentions in 1990 and 1991, when it
had squarely rejected them once before.
In other instances, arguments raised in opposition to the
initial draft of legislation had been addressed by the inclusion of
specific language responding, to the extent the proponents were
willing to do so, to those professed objections. The critical defect
of Wards Cove, Lorance, Betts, and McMann was their failure to understand that those modifications of the legislation at issue reflected a very deliberate decision by Congress to go only so far toward

195 Loranc, 490 U.S. at 912 (permitting challenges to invidiously motivated seniority
rules would be unfair to "those who work-perhaps for many years-in reliance upon the
validity of a facially lawful seniority system" and "disrupt those valid reliance interests;"
female plaintiff "could. defeat the settled (and worked for) expectations of her co-workers").

196 Betts, 492 U.S. at 177 (broader reading of ADEA would invalidate most post-Act
benefit plans that discriminate against older workers).
197 Mc.Mann, 434 U.S. at 203 (broader reading of ADEA would result in "wholesale
invalidation of retirement plans instituted in good faith before its passage").
198 Similarly, in Robinson, the Court theorized that Congress in adopting the Education of the Handicapped Act ("EHA"), which required the states to provide effective educational services to some 8 million handicapped children, Robinson, 468 U.S. at 1009,
decided to deny counsel fees to plaintiffs suing to enforce the EHA because of "the financial burden already imposed on States by the responsibility of providing education for
handicapped children." Id. at 1020.
199 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 202-04 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

-
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accommodating the arguments of opponents as the specific language clearly indicated. Limiting amendments of the sort at issue
in these cases should be carefully and narrowly construed precisely
because they do tend to limit the extent to which the legislation
achieves its underlying purpose. Another reason for narrow construction is that Congress is unlikely to have intended to incorporate a limitation not clear on the face of the amendment itself.
That is especially true where the argument to which the amendment responds, if accepted without reservation, might well eviscerate the entire law.
Wards Cove is a classic example of this situation. A central and
repeated argument against passage of Title VII was that it would
coerce employers into adopting quotas; a somewhat nominal provision was added to Title VII in response. But the members of Congress who attached primary importance to avoiding quotas, or
professed to do so, voted against passage of the law. Resurrection
of avoidance of quotas as the controlling principle of Title VII interpretation is a perversion of the priorities of the Congress that
enacted the law. Because every application of Title VII can be alleged to entail some such risk--or at least opponents so argued in
1963 and 1964-there is no application of the law that could not
be deemed inappropriate under this principle of interpretation.
Section 703(h) was added to Title VII in response to organized labor's concerns about the impact of the law on seniority
systems. Of course, the best way to protect seniority systems from
Title VII would have been. to exempt them entirely from coverage
by the statute. But that is not the course chosen by Congress;
rather, a carefully framed and limited amendment was drafted that
declared certain systems lawful, while others remained forbidden.
Lorance went beyond this compromise by reading into Title VII a
special statute of limitations applicable to the very systems that remained unlawful, and which section 703(h) did not exempt, a
limitations rule which made challenges to many of those systems a
practical impossibility. Of course, Congress in 1964 might have
chosen to accord an express exemption to a larger group of seniority systems, or to provide the sort of practical exemption conferred by Lorance, but Congress clearly made a deliberate decision
not to go that far. Betts and McMann erred because they treated as
a complete exemption from the ADEA a limiting amendment
designed only to protect cost justified age distinctions in benefit
plans.
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All of these decisions failed because they lost sight of the
actual purpose which had led Congress to enact the statutes at
issue in the first place. To read these opinions, one might conclude that Title VII was adopted to stop quotas, protect management prerogatives, and immunize invidiously motivated seniority
systems from legal attack, and that the ADEA was enacted to endorse benefit plans that discriminated against older workers. These
decisions are virtually devoid of consideration of whether the proposed statutory interpretation would facilitate or interfere with the
eradication of invidious discrimination. Objections decisively rejected by Congress returned from the legislative grave, a species of
vampire argument, to control the interpretation of the very laws
they attacked in vain when on the floor of the House and Senate.
Fanciful "plain language" interpretations have at least some chance
of being correct, if only inadvertently; but interpretations based on
such resurrected objections are almost certain to be disapproved
by Congress.
Statutory construction based on problems hypothesized to
follow from an unfettered implementation of the underlying statutory purpose, here the elimination of discrimination, is fraught
with other difficulties as well. First, the courts are not particularly
well equipped to evaluate what would and would not amount to a
serious practical problem, on the job or in the administration of
the law. A majority of the Supreme Court in Patterson, for example, insisted there would be grave difficulties if discrimination
victims were accorded remedies under both Title VII and section
1981. When that issue was before Congress in 1990 and 1991,
however, not a soul could be found among the legions of conservative and business opponents of the Civil Rights Act, or at the
EEOC (which also opposed other aspects of the legislation) who
would either defend the decision in Patterson or suggest .that overlapping remedies were the source of any difficulty. Unlike 1972,
no amendment was even offered in 1990 and 1991 to eliminate
those overlapping remedies. Congress was unwilling to require all
employment discrimination victims to go through the Title VII
administrative process because, inter alia, Congress knew from
experience, as the Supreme Court apparently did not, that that
process had often proved to be ineffective. Similarly, the Patterson
majority apparently believed its narrowing of section 1981 would
not "sacrific[e] any significant coverage of the civil rights
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laws."'
Congress overturned Patterson, in part, because the
Court was clearly mistaken. The committee reports on the 1991
Civil Rights Act stressed that Patterson had the effect of removing
all coverage for employees at 3.7 million firms with less than fifteen workers, and of eliminating any effective monetary remedy
for racial harassment by any employer.201
An interpretive methodology grounded on the avoidance of
such hypothetical problems also has considerable potential for
abuse. In Wards Cove, a conservative majority suggested that quotas
would result if, in analyzing the disparate impact of an employer's
actions, several different practices were combined and evaluated
together.202 However, only seven years earlier in Connecticut v.
Tea42 13 several of those same conservatives, then in the minority,
had insisted with equal certainty that quotas would surely result
unless multiple practices were in fact treated in combination by the
courts. 2°4 Obviously, both of these contentions could not have
been correct; in reality neither was. But a comparison of Wards
Cove and Teal demonstrate how easily these sorts of difficulties can
be conjured up to justify any desired statutory interpretation.
Reliance on objections advanced in opposition to a statute,
even where those objections led to some responsive amendment,
or to statements by proponents that the legislation would not have
the feared effect, is imprudent for another, potentially more
vexsome, reason. In some instances, the objection itself may have
been a political ruse, and the response an equally political bit of
public posturing, all in a process which no participant in the process took at face value. The 1964 debates regarding Title VII are a
classic example of this situation. Opponents of the legislation
objected at great length that it would lead to quotas, and an
amendment was added in response. To this day, the Supreme
Court takes all this at face value. In reality, however, most of these
opponents did not object to Title VII because they were against
quotas; they voted against the bill because they favored racial

200 Id. at 181-82.
201 S. REP. No. 315, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 644, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 18 (1990).
202 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657. The passage from Watson cited by the Wards Cove
majority is even more emphatic about this danger. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,
487 U.S. 977, 992 (1988) (employers would be liable for "the myriad of innocent causes
that may lead to statistical imbalances in the composition of their workforces.").
203 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
204 Id. at 458-60 (dissenting opinion).
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discrimination against blacks. The reigning social system most of
the opponents of the 1964 Civil Rights Act wanted to preserve was
not some Anti-Defamation League-inspired color blind society, but
pervasive, blatant, malicious bigotry.
The legislative history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act involved a
number of such charades. With the exception of a handful of
inside-the-Beltway ideologues, none of the major opponents of the
bills which passed the House and Senate actually believed they
would lead to quotas, or even cared about the quota issue except
as a public relations device. For the business community and their
congressional supporters-and the business community was the
critical force in sustaining President Bush's 1990 veto-the controlling concern was how to prevent an amendment that would have
allowed juries to award compensatory and punitive damages in sex
discrimination cases. Members of both parties acknowledged at the
end of the eighteen month battle that this had been the real
dispute at issue from the outset.2 5 Prior to Patterson, of course,
such damages had long been available in race discrimination cases,
but few blacks sit on federal juries outside a handful of major
cities, and actual awards were modest. As an article in the Wall
Street Journal alerted business readers shortly after the final compromise was struck,' the availability of jury trials and damages
under Title VII sex discrimination cases was the major innovation
of concern to employers that was wrought by the legislation. However, little, if any, of this would be apparent to a judge reading
the congressional debates.

205 137 CONG. REC. S15338 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1991) (Sen. Jeffords); ii
(Sen. Nickles); id. at S15383 (Sen. Jeffords); i. at S15445 (Sen. Robb).
206

at S15378

Forget the hysteria over racial quotas. As the White House-approved civil rights
comprise heads for likely passage this week, the greatest impact for business will
be an increase in the costs of lawsuits brought by women ... who successfully
sue for deliberate job discrimination.
. . . [O]nce the deal was struck, quotas proved a phony divide. If the bill
clears Congress and is signed by the president, as expected, business will have to
contend less with any real or imagined quotas than with a likely increase in lawsuits from women alleging deliberate sex-based employment discrimination, including sexual harassment. ...
Now that the White House has resolved the quota issue, even the bill's
most vociferous opponents are conceding that the charge was a distraction.
Timothy Noah, Lawsuits by Women, Disabled Are Likely to be the Main Result of Compise Civil
Rights Bi/l WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1991, at A18.
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Thus, the third overall lesson of the corrective legislation is
that a court is likely to misconstrue a statute if it attaches controlling importance to avoiding "problems" that might be caused
by implementation of the law, rather than to solving the problem
which led Congress to enact the statute in the first place.
IV. THE PRIMACY OF PURPOSE
The methodology most often advanced by the dissenting opinions in these cases was to identify the general purpose of the
legislation at issue and then to interpret the law in the manner
which best advanced that purpose. That was the approach to statutory construction which prevailed in the nineteenth century, when
the Supreme Court admonished that "the cause and necessity of
making the law," consideration of "the evil it is designed to remedy," "must limit and control the literal import of the terms and
phrases employed." 7 The recent majority opinions overturned
by Congress, however, usually, at times self-consciously, ignored the
overall goal of the provision in question. In some instances, the
majority argued that legislative purpose was irrelevant or that it
simply did not exist in any legally relevant sense.
In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,2"' Justices Brennan and Marshall argued that the question presented should be evaluated "in
terms of the broad social objectives promoted by Title VII,"2°
and concluded that "pregnancy exclusions built into disability programs both financially burden women workers and act to break
down the continuity of the employment relationship, thereby exac-

erbating women's comparatively transient role in the labor
force."2 1 ° In Grove City College v. Bell, 21 Justices Brennan and
Marshall insisted that the majority "ignores the primary purposes
for which Congress enacted Title IX," emphasizing "the primary
congressional purpose behind the statute was 'to avoid the use of
federal resources to support discriminatory practices.'" 212 In Library of Congress v. Shaw, 213 Brennan and Marshall, now joined by
Justice Stevens, maintained that "[t]he 'underlying congressional
policy'" behind that statute was "that federal employees enjoy the
207
208
209
210
211
212
213

Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459, 460, 463 (1892).
429 U.S. 125 (1976).
Id. at 148.
Id. at 158.
465 U.S. 555 (1984).
Id. at 582 (quoting Canon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979)).
478 U.S. 310 (1986).
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same access to courts and the same judicial remedies that are
available to other Title VII plaintiffs."" 4 They criticized the majority for a result which "frustrates the intention of Congress that
federal employees enjoy the same rights and remedies in the
courts as do the individuals in the private sector."1 5
In the 1989 cases, the dissents repeatedly emphasized the
importance of congressional purpose and chastised the majority
for thwarting the achievement of those goals. The Patterson dissent
objected.that the majority's interpretation of section 1981 was "antithetical to Congress' vision of a society in which contractual
opportunities are equal." 6 In Wards Cove, the dissenters argued
the Court had turned "a blind eye to the.., purpose of Title
VII,"1 7 and abandoned an earlier interpretation of the law
which had promoted "our national goal of eliminating barriers
that define economic opportunity not by aptitude and ability but
by race." 18 In Lorance, Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun
argued: "Viewing each application of a discriminatory system as a
new violation serves the equal opportunity goals of Title VII by
ensuring that victims of discrimination are not prevented from
having their day in court."21 9 The majority decision, they insisted,
was "glaringly at odds with the .purposes of Title VII."2 0 Senator
Dole later commented that the holding in Lorance "fails to protect
sufficiently the important interest in eliminating employment discrimination that is embodied in Title VII." 221 In Betts, Marshall
and Brennan complained that the Court's interpretation was "antithetical to the ADEA's goal of eradicating baseless discrimination
2
against older workers."1
In West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, Justice
Stevens, who had voted with the majority in Lorance and Betts,
wrote a dissenting opinion emphasizing the general importance of
congressional purpose:

214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
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Id. at 325.
Id.
Patterson, 491 U.S. at 189.
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 663.
Id. at 662.
Lorance, 490 U.S. at 915.
Id. at 914; see also id. at 915 ("flouting the intent of Congress").
137 CONG. REC. S3025 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1991).
Betts, 492 U.S. at 183.
111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991).
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In recent years the Court has vacillated between a purely
literal approach to the task of statutory interpretation and an
approach that seeks guidance from historical context, legislative
history, and prior cases identifying the purpose that motivated
the legislation. Thus, for example, in Chfistiansburg Garment Co.
v. EEOC [the] ... holding rested entirely on our evaluation of
the relevant congressional policy and found no support within
the four comers of the statutory text. Nevertheless, the holding
was unanimous and, to the best of my knowledge, evoked no
adverse criticism or response in Congress.
On those occasions, however, when the Court has put on
its thick grammarian's spectacles and ignored the available
evidence of congressional purpose ...
the congressional response has been dramatically different ....
[W]e do the country a disservice when we needlessly ignore persuasive evidence of Congress' actual purpose and require it...
to restate its purpose in more precise English."
The controlling congressional purpose in West Virginia University
Hospitals, Justice Stevens argued, was to provide effective access to
the judicial process.
Most often, the majority opinions in these cases are simply
devoid of any discussion of congressional purpose or of why Congress might have wanted the particular result arrived at by the
Court. Thus, when the dissents criticized the crazy-quilt result.in
Patterson as "aimless" and "askew"225 and the outcome in Lorance
as "bizarre," 6 the majority did not bother to respond because it
apparently saw no need to fit its conclusion into any overall statutory purpose. In Betts, the majority proposed a circular argument
for addressing the issue of congressional purpose. The "purpose"
of a law was to do whatever the Court had construed the law (e.g.
its plain language) to mean. "McMann... rejected the contention
that the purposes of the Act can be distinguished from the Act
itself: 'The distinction relied on is untenable because the Act is
the vehicle by which its purposes are expressed and carried
out.'" 22 7 Thus, if in a case like Patterson, the "plain language" for-

224

I& at 1154-55 (citation omitted); see also id. at 1153 n.9. Chfistiansburg Garment Co.

v. EEOC 434 U.S. 412 (1978), held that counsel fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs in
Title VII cases were to be awarded under a standard more liberal than that for prevailing defendants.
225 Pattenon, 491 U.S. at 222.
226 Loranc4 490 U.S. at 916.
227 Betts, 492 U.S. at 176 (quoting United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192,
198 (1977)).
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bids discrimination in hiring, but permits race-based dismissals,
that peculiar result is by definition the purpose of the law. In
Shaw and West Virginia University Hospitals, the majority offered a
different argument, explaining that "purpose" and "policy" could
play no role in statutory interpretation because the courts had no
authority to adopt policies or seek to achieve purposes of their
own selection." 8 Justice Stevens correctly noted in the latter case
that this argument was entirely unresponsive to complaints that
the majority's interpretation frustrated the purposes and policies
of Congress. 2' The Court in Martin v. Wilks
insisted it simply did not matter whether its decision would frustrate enforcement of Title VII. 2

It is readily apparent that many of the overturned opinions
would have been decided differently had the majority given weight
to whichever interpretation of the statute at issue would have advanced the underlying congressional purpose. That very approach,
eschewed by conservative Justices in these civil rights decisions, has
been enthusiastically applied by them in other non-civil rights cases. Thus, in Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 1 2 Jus-

tice O'Connor, writing for herself, Justices Scalia and White, and
the Chief Justice, asserted "[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone."3 In Wisconsin Department of Revenue v. William
Wrigley, Jr., Co.,2 4 Justice Scalia, in an opinion joined by Justices
Thomas, O'Connor, Souter, White, and Stevens, focused on
"'Congress' primary goal'" in enacting the statute at issue.2 5 In
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini North River
Assocs.,2 " Justice O'Connor, in an opinion joined inter alia by
Justices Powell and White and then Chief Justice Burger, insisted

228 Shaw, 478 U.S. at 321 ("'Courts lack the power to award interest. . . on the
basis of what they think is or is not sound policy.'") (quoting United States v. N.Y. Rayon Importing Co., 329 U.S. 654, 663 (1947)).
229 West Virginia Univ. Hosps., 111 S. Ct. at 1148 (it "is not for judges to prescribe"
what is "the better disposition") (emphasis in original).
230 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
231 Id. at 766-68.
232 112 S. Ct. 2374 (1992).
233 Id. at 2381-82.
234 112 S. Ct. 2447 (1992).
235 Id. at 2453 (quoting Heublein, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 409 U.S. 275,
280 (1972)).
236 459 U.S. 297 (1983).
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the law there2 7at issue "be liberally construed in conformance with
its purpose." 3
This reliance on congressional purpose, routinely invoked by
all members of the Court in other cases and a recurring theme of
the dissents in the overturned civil rights cases, is consistent with
the realities of the legislative process. It is beyond the ability of
any Congress to consider, not to mention set out in text or legislative history, what outcome it wants in every possible situation that
may some day arise under a given statute. What Congress does
know and intend, of relevance to every case, is the general result
it enacted a statute to bring about. Although only a handful of
Representatives and Senators are, indeed could be, familiar with
the actual text of the thousands of pages of legislation enacted
each year, virtually every member of Congress understands the
general purposes of most pieces of legislation.
When courts are confronted by circumstances that Congress
did not expressly consider and address, there is no specific congressional intent-as to the result in that case-to be found in the
language or legislative history. In such a case, the general purpose
of the legislation is not the best guide to statutory interpretation,
it is the only meaningful guide. Actual statutory construction is
complicated, of course, by the fact that Congress does not expressly label the situations it has not specifically considered. Thus, a
court often cannot be sure whether the apparent hints of meaning
in a statutory phrase or a committee report are the inartful expression of a specific congressional decision, or the unintended
implications of a passage written to address some entirely different
issue. Consideration of congressional purpose is therefore always
prudent, because a court cannot ordinarily, or at least prudently,
be confident that other indicia of meaning are indeed meaningful,
let alone conclusive.
Unlike the often difficult search for specific congressional
intent with regard to a particular question, the underlying general
purpose of a statute or provision is ordinarily readily apparent.
Frequently, that purpose is entirely obvious from the text and title
of the law. If there is difficulty in determining which alternative
construction will advance the statutory purpose, it is most likely to
concern the often practical judgments which must be made regarding the real world consequences of those interpretations. Even
this, however, seems far less likely to provoke controversy than, for

237

1& at 315-16 (Justice Rehnquist joined in the result).
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example, parsing the opaque or vague language of a statute. Thus,
no one could seriously have denied that the construction urged by
the dissents in Patterson, Wards Cove, and Lorance would have increased protection against discrimination, that the availability of
expert witness fees in West Virginia Hospitalswould have increased
access to the courts, or that prejudgment interest in Shaw would
have provided to federal employees the same remedies as were
available to private plaintiffs.
V. THE ACTIONS AND VIEWS OF LATER CONGRESSES
In almost half of the overturned cases, the dissents relied in
part on actions taken by Congress subsequent to the enactment of
the statute in issue, including specific postenactment legislative
consideration of the particular question of statutory interpretation
before the Court. In most instances, the majority chose simply to
ignore that information, without even bothering to explain why it
should not be considered. The few majority opinions which do discuss this source of guidance insist that it is so inherently unreliable as to be unusable. Thus, the Betts majority insisted that
postenactment legislative debate "is of little assistance," 2" and
the Pattersonmajority suggested that it is "'impossible to assert with
any degree of assurance' 23 9 what significance should be attached
to any congressional action short of an express and controlling
amendment to the statute at issue. Patterson warned of the "danger
of placing undue reliance" on postenactment developments. 2'
The action of Congress in overturning Patterson demonstrated that,
to the contrary, the greater danger lay in placing insufficient reliance on such developments.2 4
In other cases, the Court has been entirely willing to rely on
postenactment developments in interpreting a statute. In the 1989
decision in Patterson,five members of the Court dismissed as irrele-.
vant the fact that. Congress had rejected an amendment that
would have achieved the result adopted by the majority opinion.
But in 1992, three of those Justices, including the author of the

238
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Bells, 492 U.S. at 168.
Patterson, 491 U.S. at 175 n.1 (quoting Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480

U.S. 616, 671-72 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
240 Id
241 As authority for its insistence on dismissing such developments as useless, Betts,
ironically, cited McMann, Betts, 492 U.S. at 168, which, of course, had been overturned by
Congress as wrongly decided.
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Patterson decision, joined a majority opinion which relied on just
such a rejected amendment in interpreting the Internal Revenue
Code.24 In a 1992 criminal case, the Court relied on mere congressional inaction, although there was no suggestion that legislation inconsistent with the majority interpretation had ever been
voted down or even proposed.2 43 The conservative majority in
Grove City, although imposing a harsh program-specificity requirement, held that federal scholarships did constitute federal assistance triggering application of Title IX and other anti-discrimination statutes. The latter aspect of the Court's opinion insisted that
postenactment developments provided "[persuasive evidence of
Congress' intent concerning student financial aid," citing rejection
of one amendment, failure to act on other proposals, and a Senate speech regarding that amendment given four years after the
enactment of Title IX itself. 244 The very postenactment history
which Patterson dismissed as unusably ambiguous, was expressly
relied on by seven members of the Court in Runyon v.
could hardly be a clearMcCrary,245 who announced that "[tlhere
246
er indication of congressional" intent.

Interpreting postenactment legislative developments is a difficult and at times hazardous undertaking. Congressional inaction
may indeed mean nothing at all, and statements, particularly by
individual members of the House and Senate, may be unreliable
or uninformed. But to acknowledge that the meaning in these
developments may be difficult to detect is not to suggest it may
cavalierly be ignored. The failure of the overturned decisions in
this regard is not that they misinterpreted the relevant
postenactment legislative actions and statements, but that they
made no serious effort to assess their content and possible importance.
Betts, for example, asserted that postenactment statements by
legislators and committees are all entitled to little weight, citing
a 2 47 The indiConsumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.

242
243
joined
244
245

United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1871 n.6 (1992).
Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881, 1889-90 (1992) (the majority opinion was
by Justices White, Souter, and O'Connor).
Grove City, 465 U.S. at 567, 568 n.19.
427 U.S. 160 (1976).

246 Id at 175. Runyon in turn cited two other instances in which the Court had relied on the failure of Congress to enact proposals introduced but never voted on. Flood
v. Kuhn, 497 U.S. 258, 283 (1972); Joint Indus. Bd. of Elec. Indus. v. United States, 391
U.S. 224, 228 n.6 (1968).
247 447 U.S. 102 (1980).
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vidual statement unsuccessfully cited by the petitioner in Sylvania
had been made by Senator Moss. The Court noted there that
Moss had actually disagreed with the relevant section at the time it
was enacted, and-concluded that "[h]is statement is thus not one
that provides a reliable indication as to congressional intention."2' In Betts, on the other hand, the postenactment statement cited by the petitioner, and disregarded by the majority, had
been made by Senator Javits in 1978.249 Senator Javits was the
author of the very 1967 provision at issue,' and the meaning of
his preenactment remarks was central to the dispute before the
Court . " The Senate report overturning Betts expressly cited Senator Javits' postenactment statements. 2 It is indicative of how
artificial the Court's methodology had become that in 1989 seven
members of the Court insisted that they knew far better what
Javits himself had originally meant in 1967, than had Senator Javits
himself in 1978.
In Sylvania, the petitioner also unsuccessfully invoked a sentence in a postenactment conference committee report.253 The
Court noted that the sentence had little relationship to the matter
before the conference committee, and was not repeated elsewhere
in the legislative history of the subsequent legislation involved. "In
light of this background," the Court concluded, "the statement of
the Conference Committee is far from authoritative as an expression of congressional will."" i In Betts, on the other hand, the
conference committee report at issue, expressly rejecting the Supreme Court's holding and reasoning in McMann,U5 was central
to congressional rejection of McMann. That rejection report was,
as the Betts majority conceded, reiterated throughout the legislative
history.

26

The Patterson majority held hopelessly ambiguous the same
legislative development that the Court had found crystal clear only
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Id. at 118-19.
Betts, 492 U.S. at 191 n.9 (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 178.

251

Compare id. at 178-79 (majority opinion) uith id. at 190 n.8 (dissenting opinion).
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S. REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., .2d Sess. 9-10 (1990).

253

Sylvania, 447 U.S. at 117-20.

254 Id. at 120.
255 H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978), quoted in Belts, 492 U.S. at
167-68.
256 Bets, 492 U.S. at 168 (citing remarks by Rep. Waxman, Rep. Hawkins, and Sen.
Javits). Similar statements were made by Senator Williams and Representatives Weiss and
Pepper. S. REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1990).
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thirteen years earlier. The event at issue was the rejection in 1972
of the unsuccessful Hruska Amendment, which would have made
Title VII the exclusive remedy for private discrimination in employment. The Patterson Court insisted that rejection of that
amendment did not reflect any congressional approval of section
1981 employment discrimination actions against private employers,
dismissing the incident as "the failure of an amendment to a different statute offered before our decision in Runyon."257 In other cases, however, the Court has repeatedly attached significance to the
rejection of such proposals. The fact that the Hruska proposal
would have amended Title VII rather than section 1981 seems
entirely beside the point; both Senator Hruska and those who opposed his amendment understood it was directed specifically at
limiting the scope of section 1981.258 The majority's emphasis on
the fact that this occurred before Runyon implies that Congress in
1972 could not have been concerned with private section 1981 actions, since the Supreme Court itself did not approve such actions
until the 1976 decision in Runyon. The debates made clear, however, that Congress nonetheless understood section 1981 to apply to
private conduct,25 9 relying, as did the Court in Runyon, on the
1968 decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.2 ° Indeed, even before
Runyon, the Supreme Court itself had held that the applicability of
section 1981 to private employers was already "well settled among
the Federal Courts of Appeals."26 1 In short, Patterson, like Betts,
falls well short of a serious effort to ascertain the actual significance of the relevant postenactment events.
There are several identifiable reasons why in many of the
overturned decisions postenactment developments would have
provided a reliable tool for interpreting the statutes at issue. Often
many members of a later Congress had served in the earlier Congress that enacted the statute in question. In some instances, such
as Senator Javits' explanation of the Javits Amendment, later remarks or actions are direct evidence of the specific intent and
understanding of the Congress that originally enacted the statute.
Even where a subsequently arising issue was not considered by the
original Congress, still serving members from that earlier era are
likely to recall full well the purpose of the original legislation, and
257
258

Patterson, 491 U.S. at 175 n.1 (emphasis in original).
See debates cited id at 202-03 (dissenting opinion).

259
260

See id.
392 U.S. 409 (1968).

261 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975).
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thus to be uniquely able to assess the impact on that purpose of
the proposed alternative interpretations. Frequently, the Supreme
Court's interpretation of a statute turns on the Court's evaluation
of the practical consequences of its decision. Postenactment action
may reflect the assessment of those same issues by Congress, which
is often better able than the Court to evaluate such practical issues. Thus, in Patterson, the majority relied in part on its view that
a narrow interpretation of section 1981 was needed so that employees could not "circumvent" the Title VII administrative procedures. 262 This, is precisely the concern which Congress considered when it rejected Senator Hruska's argument that a limitation
on section 1981 was necessary so that plaintiffs could not "completely bypass" those procedures. 6 Because of its greater familiarity with both government agencies and the realities of life outside the courtroom, Congress may also see that the consequences
of an interpretation would frustrate a statute because of a practical
problem a court might overlook. Thus, in rejecting the Hruska
amendment, Congress was concerned about plaintiffs" for. whom
Title VII 21 might be unavailable, a problem which loomed large
in explanations of the 1991 Civil Rights Act,265 but which the
Patterson majority seemingly failed to consider. The contrary views
of even new members of Congress should undermine the Court's
view that the statute contains "plain language" dispositive of an issue. This highlights the possibility that the Court may be using a
"plain language" methodology very different from the way in
which ordinary members of the House and Senate actually read
legislation.
Subsequent, more specific legislation on the same or a related
subject may provide an important aid to statutory interpretation.
At times, Congress establishes only general principles when it first
addresses a given problem. Later, more specific statutes may well
reflect an informed evaluation of how those principles should be
implemented in a more particular situation, an implementation reflecting Congress' understanding of the principles themselves and
of the practical issues raised by that specific situation. For exam-
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Patkron, 491 U.S. at 181.

263

118 CONG. REc. 3368-69 (1972).

264

Id. at 3370 (remarks of Sen. Javits).

265 S. REP. No. 315, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1990) (section 1981 alone covers employers with less than 15 employees and discrimination in contracting unrelated to employment); H.R. REP. No. 644, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 88 (1990); H.R. REP. No.

644, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 42 (1990).
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pie, during the years between the 1964 enactment of Title VII and
the 1976 decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilfert,2" Congress had
adopted a statute treating pregnancy-related illnesses like all other
forms of sickness under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance
Act.26 7 Congress had also expressly endorsed a Title IX regulation forbidding pregnancy-based discrimination in benefits.2"
This congressional exposition of the anti-discrimination principle
would have been a more reliable guide for elucidating Title VII
than the Supreme Court's 1974 interpretation of the general requirements of Equal Protection in the century-old Fourteenth
Amendment.2
Similarly, in Smith v. Robinson,'70 the earlier
statute, the Education of the Handicapped Act ("EHA"), 27 1 did
not address the question of whether successful plaintiffs could be
awarded counsel fees. At the time, virtually unanimous lower court
decisions held that such fees could be awarded in any litigation
under statutes such as the EHA, without any need for specific
statutory authorization. The Supreme Court decision in Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,2 held that counsel fee
awards ordinarily required express statutory authorization, thus
forcing Congress to focus more specifically on this aspect of civil
rights remedies. In 1976,275 and again in 1978,74 Congress
adopted legislation, literally applicable to the type of violation at
issue in Robinson, authorizing counsel fees. The Robinson majority
misread the silence of the EHA as an explicit rejection of counsel
fees. The Court's decision would not have been overturned by
Congress had the Court recognized in the 1976 and 1978 acts a
specific congressional evaluation of a practical problem not expressly dealt with in the EHA.
Robinson, and to some degree West Virginia University Hospitals,
rest on an entirely unrealistic attitude toward the legislative pro-
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429 U.S. 125 (1976).
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No. 90-257, § 201(a), 82

Stat. 23

(1968)

(codified

at 45

U.S.C. §

351(k) (2) (1988)).
268 45 C.F.R. § 86.57 (c) (1992) (originally enacted in 1972, 86 Stat. 373, 374, 20
U.S.C. §§ 1681-1682). This regulation was promulgated on June 4, 1975. 40 Fed. Reg.

24137 (1975).
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Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 133-34 (citing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)).

270 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
271 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988).
272

421 U.S. 240 (1975).

273

Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641

(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988)).
274 Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 505, 92 Stat. 2982 (1978)

(1988)).

(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794a
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cess, an attitude that poses serious problems for Congress. These
decisions proceed as if every Congress is entirely omniscient, foreseeing every issue and problem that may arise at a later time and
be addressed by subsequent legislation. Thus, if a 1980 law contains a remedy not mentioned in a 1960 law, the Court infers that
the 1960 Congress specifically intended to reject that remedy. In
reality, the 1980 Congress may well have been addressing with
specificity an issue that the 1960 Congress did not consider, or a
problem that for practical or legal reasons simply did not exist two
decades earlier. By this logic, whenever Congress enacts legislation
with a new degree of specificity in one area, the Court will construe' all earlier laws more narrowly as a consequence. Legislation
enacted to increase remedies may, overall, have precisely the opposite effect. Responding to this perverse result, the drafters of
the 1991 Civil Rights Act at one point considered including language stating: "In interpreting Federal civil rights laws....
courts... shall not rely on the amendments made by the Civil
Rights Act of 1990 as a basis for limiting the theories of liability,
rights, and-remedies available under civil rights laws not expressly
amended by such Act."2 7 When a new piece of legislation addresses an issue with an increased degree of specificity, it is often
impracticable for Congress to review every related or analogous
existing statute to insert the same language. Rather than giving
such later specific legislation the effect of narrowing earlier laws,
the Court should look to the more specific subsequent legislation
as a guide to interpreting the earlier more general measures.
Deference to congressional interpretation of earlier laws is
often essential to give full effect to subsequent legislation. The
courts often assert that Congress is presumed to know the law
when it adopts a statute; "presume" is usually the pivotal word, because the doctrine is ordinarily invoked precisely because there is
no evidence that any member of Congress actually knew anything
about the legal principle the court intends to invoke. But almost
every piece of legislation is adopted in the context of some other
law, or perceived law, in the same area. Whether the terms of a
statute will have the effect Congress obviously intended depends

275 H.R. REP. NO. 644, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt.2, at 5 (1990) (emphasis added); see
a/so i at 42 ("'The Committee does not want its efforts to restore protections that have
historically been accorded to civil rights claimants under Title VII and Section 1981 to be
construed as somehow narrowing the .rights and'remedies available under any other federal civil rights statutes.").
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on the continued vitality of that perceived legal context. A change
in that context can give the statute an effect Congress never intended, or render it devoid of any effect at all. Suppose that Congress, intending to make a grant to California, directs the funds to
"any state within the definition of section X," understanding that
the previously enacted section X, referring to "the biggest state,"
meant California. A subsequent decision that "biggest" referred to
size, not population, would redirect the funds to Alaska. Equally
important, an interpretation clearly pivotal to the meaning of
some later statute represents the considered judgment of the full
Congress, not an individual member or committee.
In other contexts, the Court has recognized the importance
of such subsequent legislation. In United States v. Burke,276 the
Court was required to determine whether the exclusion from taxable income of "damages received on account of personal injuries
or sickness"2 77 encompassed nonphysical injuries. In holding that
it did, the Court noted the section had subsequently been amended in 1989 to allow exclusion of punitive damages from income
only in cases involving "physical injury or physical sickness." "The
enactment of this limited amendment addressing only punitive
damages," the Court reasoned, "shows that Congress assumed that
other damages (i.e., compensatory) would be excluded in cases of
both physical and non physical injury." 7 The manifest intent of
the 1989 amendment, to allow exclusion of compensatory but not
punitive damages for nonphysical injury, would have been thwarted had the Court construed the underlying statute to bar exclusion of any damages related to nonphysical injuries.
A number of the overturned decisions involved just this problem. In Aramco, for example, Congress had amended the ADEA in
1983 to expressly authorize extraterritorial application so that the
ADEA would be coextensive with Title VII. Lower court decisions
prior to 1983 had held that only Title VII, not the ADEA, would
apply to American citizens working for American firms abroad.279
The 1991 majority opinion in Aramco created precisely the sort of
anomaly Congress thought it had eliminated eight years earlier.2' 8 Prior to Grove City, Congress in 1974 had amended Title

276 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
277 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (1988).
278 Burke 112 S. Ct. at 1872 n.6 (emphasis added).
279 Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1244 n.7 (dissenting opinion).
280 The existence of such an anomaly can have potentially serious consequences.
Prior to 1983 an intent to discriminate on the basis of age was a potential defense to a
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IX to exempt college fraternities and sororities, organizations affiliated with federally assisted colleges but not themselves operating
federally assisted programs. The manifest intent of this legislation,
like the amendment in Burke, was to treat fraternities and sororities differently than other parts of the institutions not receiving
federal funds.2 ' The Grove City opinion obliterated that distinction. Congress may also rely on its understanding of prior statutes
in deciding to reject subsequent proposals as superfluous. A decade prior to Mobile v. Bolden,28 Congress, in renewing the Voting Rights Act, declined to include a provision authorizing suits
against practices with "the purpose or effect" of discriminating,
explaining that such suits were already authorized by section 2 of
the original Act. 2' Judicial indifference to congressional understanding of prior laws may in these and other circumstances substantially contribute to the problems of an already overburdened
Congress.
In determining whether to apply the doctrine of stare decisis,
the Supreme Court consistently and sensibly assesses whether the
principles of subsequent legislation are consistent with the Court's
interpretation of the prior law. Thus in Patterson, the majority, in
adhering to its decision in Runyon that the ,1866 Civil Rights Act
forbade private discrimination, emphasized that adherence to that
interpretation was buttressed by the fact that
[i]n recent decades, state and federal legislation has been enacted to prohibit private racial discrimination in many aspects
of our society ....

Runyon is entirely consistent with our

society's deep commitment to the eradication of discrimination
based on a person's race ....
"[M]yriad Acts of Congress ... attest a firm national
poli"2s4
cy to prohibit racial segregation and discrimination.
In deciding whether section 1981 applied to discrimination in the
form of racial harassment, however, the majority saw no value in
the fact that such an application would also have been consistent
with those "myriad acts," which treated racial harassment like any

Title VII claim. Under Aramco, an intent to discriminate on the basis of race or sex became a potential defense to an ADEA claim.
281 Grove City, 465 U.S. at 596 n.11 (dissenting opinion).
282 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
283 See S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1982).
284 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 174, 191 (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574 (1983)).
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other form of discrimination. On the contrary, the fact that Title
VII "'attest[ed] a firm national policy to prohibit racial" harassment
on the job was, for the Court, a persuasive reason to interpret
section 1981 in precisely the opposite manner.285 If congruence
with subsequent legislation is a sound reason for adhering to the
interpretation of an earlier law, surely it must support that very
same interpretation if it arises as a question of first impression.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The pattern of legal reasoning in the sixteen overturned decisions, and in the respective dissents, is surprisingly instructive. A
review of these cases might have revealed that the majority and
dissenting opinions, having considered the same body of information and utilizing identical standards, simply arrived at different
conclusions. Reasonable jurists can and do disagree in situations of
that sort, and such disagreements would not have been particularly
enlightening. The conflicts in these cases regarding the meaning
of the disputed legislative histories are of this type; no particular
conclusions can be drawn for future cases regarding how most
accurately to interpret legislative debates and reports.
But in several other respects, the majority and dissenting
opinions were divided by clear differences regarding the appropriate methods and rules of statutory interpretation. It is possible to
identify specific methodologies that produced the, errors in these
cases and to delineate particular rules of construction which would
have led the Court to the correct results. The errors-regarding
plain language, presumptions, problems, and the actions of later
sessions of Congress-share a common characteristic. All operate
in one fashion or another as an exclusionary rule, a rationale for
deliberately ignoring available information regarding the meaning
of a statute. The exclusions are so severe that language clear
enough to exclude consideration of legislative history could itself
be excluded from consideration by the existence (or creation) of
a presumption. Exclusion of relevant and reliable evidence of congressional intent has precisely the same deleterious effect as the
exclusion of improperly seized evidence, an exclusion which conservatives regularly denounce as interfering with the truth-fifnding
function of the courts. It is hardly surprising that, having expressly
refused to consider so much of the available information regard-

285

Id. at 180-82.

1993]

STATUTORY MISINTERPRETATIONS

ing congressional intent, the Supreme Court erred so often. Indeed, it would have been surprising if such a deliberately uninformed process had produced results with which Congress agreed.
The characteristic most common to the overturned decisions
is that they expressly or tacitly exclude from consideration most if
not all of the material that might have guided and constrained
the Court's interpretation-legislative history, statutory purpose,
and subsequent congressional action. In a recent non-civil rights
case, Justice Scalia complained that absent an "agreed-upon methodology for.., interpreting text" it would no "longer make[]
sense to talk of 'a government of laws, not of men.'" 28 6 But an
agreed-upon methodology which lacks any real standards and
which systematically ignores most available information is as lawless
as a practice of changing methodology from case to case. An interpretive methodology unconstrained by any consideration of
legislative history, purpose, or'subsequent action, bears an uncanny
resemblance to the standardless discretion exercised prior to and
arguably even since Furman v. Georgia8 7 in deciding whether capital defendants would live or die.
Some of this may be the result of a now ended historical era.
As the fight over the Civil Rights Act and other legislation made
clear, from 1981 to 1992 new laws could be enacted, in effect, by
five Justices, the President, and thirty-four Senators-the Justices to
"re-interpret" some existing law and the President with one-thirdplus-one of the Senate to prevent corrective legislation. A majority
of the Court may have believed that a likely legislative gridlock
gave it the power, as a practical matter, to interpret laws in any
way it pleased; or, less harshly put, a conservative majority would
have had little (or less) reason to worry that interpretations
thwarting the will of Congress would be overturned. The change
of administrations has dramatically altered that situation. Today,
conservative interpretations of civil rights laws which ignore the
will of Congress will be worse than wrong; they will simply be ineffective. Given the ease and speed with which such misinterpretations might be overturned by a Democratic Congress and President, decisions like those handed down in the spring of 1989
would be largely a waste of the Court's time.

286 Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2250-51 (1992) (concurring opinion).
287 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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But the lessons to be gleaned from the fate of the sixteen
overturned decisions could assuredly be put to good use in other
areas of the law. The same methodological issues arise in the interpretation of non-civil rights statutes. There, the choices of
methodology do not fall along the ideological lines seen in the
overturned civil rights cases. On the contrary, conservatives at
times use the methodologies of the civil rights dissents, while liberals in some instances apply the methods of the overturned majority opinions. In Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n,28
for example, the majority relied on a limiting problem, while the
dissent relied on a presumption. On the other hand, in Wisconsin
Department of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co.,289 both the majority and dissenting opinions focused on the purpose of the statute at issue. In other recent instances, the methodological differences at issue in the overturned civil rights cases clearly were of
controlling importance. Thus, in Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling
Go.,' a majority of the Court relied on what it insisted was the
"great clarity" of the statutory language,2 1 while the dissent, including Justice O'Connor, preferred the result which advanced the
"purposes and policies" of the law.1 2 In United States v. Thompson\Center Arms Co., 5 five members of the Court found the statutory language unclear and relied on an apparently weak presumption, four Justices dissented on the ground the statutory language
was in fact clear, and Justice Stevens, who joined that dissent,
offered the only analysis which considered the purpose of the
legislation. In these and other future cases, the reasoning, and at
times the result, would be different if the Supreme Court were
now 'to take to heart the lesson in statutory interpretation taught
by the 1991 Civil Rights Act and the corrective legislation which
preceded it.
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